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"Back to the rough ground!"
Ludwig Wittgenstein
1. Introduction
1. 1. The Externalization of the Black Box
"One defining feature of traditional behaviorism is that it tried to free  
psychology from having to theorize about how animals and persons  
represent their environment. This was important, historically, because it 
seemed that behavior/environment connections are a lot clearer and  
more manageable experimentally than internal representations.
 Unfortunately, for behaviorism, it's hard to imagine a more restrictive  
rule  for  psychology  than  one  which  prohibits  hypotheses  about  
representational storage and processing. Stephen Stich, for example,  
complains against Skinner that 'we now have an enormous collection of 
experimental data which, it would seem, simply cannot be made sense 
of  unless  we  postulate  something  like'  information  processing  
mechanisms in the heads of organisms (1998, p. 649)."1
The great methodological (and epistemological) simplicity of classical 
behaviorism has its limits, and they present themselves in circumventing the 
need to  evenutally pose  the  question:  What  is  in  the  black  box? This  is 
primarily so because we seem to know something  is in the black box, for 
black  box  appears  to  be  generative  of  its  output.  Black  box  problem  is 
present because we have no access to representation or any other mental 
activity  but  via  behaviour  (including  accounts)  and  neurochemical  events. 
And it appears that events within the black box have a strange connection to 
our social  world – it  appears our social  world is a result  of,  among other 
things, the events in the black box. So the question for a social scientist is: 
what kind of a black box could have enabled the emergence of the social? 
The social scientist might reply: "Well, my kind!" And she would to a 
1 Graham, "Behaviorism", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 15.1.2015. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/
certain point be correct in saying this – she really does own a black box of  
her own. However, this is a somewhat troubling answer, because not only 
does she lack access to significant parts of her black box, the little insight  
that she has is only into one black box. She can see other scientist having 
insights into many, for instance, balls falling off a table, and making science 
about it; and she must at this point realize that introspection is in a rather 
problematic way connected to empiricism, for it appears it is the multiplicity of 
events that create empiricism, and not sensual data on one event (in this 
case, the event that is her mind). However, luckily for her, being an agent 
entails having an interaction with the environment – and in particular, having 
an interaction with signs and their power to change the environment. Thus 
our social scientist has an experience of multiple agents manipulating signs, 
and an experience of herself manipulating signs, and she can try to devise 
the theory of the semiotic procotols that give rise to the social – and these 
will,  in  turn,  inform her  of  the  black  box.  (She  also  has  experience  of  a 
sufficient  body of  literature to try to  make sense of  these events without, 
hopefully,  falling  into  certain  theoretical  traps.)  In  order  to  do  that,  the 
researcher has to count herself as a thing among things of a kind that has 
such minds  (where  a  kind stands  for  roughly:  Witgenstein's  family 
resemblance,  populations  or  any  such prototype-based  extension  [as 
opposed to a margin-based extension]), namely semiotically-capable minds. 
The  researcher  therefore  must  be  involved  in  the  model,  which  in  effect 
means  the  model  has  to  be  a  social  situation  which  is  in  some  way 
representative of the research situation (which is its prototype). The model 
must, in effect, show how does the agent (a black box) inquire, and crucially 
inquire,  but  also  how does  it  receive information,  manipulate  information, 
change information,  and articulate information to the other agent as if  the 
other is to receive it,  for  at  least  these subprocesses underlie the activity 
(behaviour) of inquiry (and as we will  see, successful inquiry [fundamental 
epistemic  practice]  significantly  improves  the  agent's  possibility  of 
membership,  renders  the agent  reflective and capable  of  manipulating its 
reasons and desires as well as the environment). The black box will therefore 
be devised as something that  allows for  the exchange between itself  and 
other black boxes – its structure will, as much as possible, be externalized 
into a protocol. 
It is, however, quite a nice coincidence that the problem of how should 
the  researcher  properly  inquire  has  a  long  tradition  within  the  branch  of 
qualitative social research, which in effect lead to the establishment of large 
methodological fields as ethnometodology (which took it for no bad reason to 
the area of sense-making procedures, where the researcher is to negotiate 
the findings with the researched), action research (which took it for no bad 
reason  to  the  area  of  actionable accounts,  where  the  researcher  is  the 
interventer,  and  therefore  sticks  around  to  see  the  consequences  of  her 
interpretation)2 and has eventually somewhat vulgarized into notions of the 
researcher's "charm".  Contemporary social  science (where science stands 
for:  dreaming  of  a  capability  of  prediction  and  intervention-with-predicted-
results into the matter it studies) for both of these reasons (that the model 
needs  to  incorporate  practices  of  inquiry,  and  that  practices  of  inquiry 
themselves are a longstanding problem of social science) needs assistance 
of social epistemology, which should claim to have priviledged knowledge on 
the nature of  human inquiry given its name. In order to do this,  it  should 
primarily focus on a descriptive theory of real epistemic practices – it should 
not ask 'how do we find The Truth?' but 'how do we institute truths?'. 
1. 2. Pragmatist Epistemology 
However, we would not be decent nor serious (and especially neither 
2 And arguably even discourse analysis, if one is to observe it as for no bad reason trying to shortcut the question of 
researcher's involvement by referral to semiotic traffic as crucial evidence of the social, which could be seen as 
stretching the geneaological point of view a bit, but the body of work being established by discourse analysis seems 
of immense importance for certain ideas presented in this model.
decent nor serious epistemologists) if we were to claim an "innocent eye" of 
any thing  descriptive.  While "descriptive" should be a name for  the set  of 
procedures, they surely stem from a certain normativity. To explicate it, we 
could say that our view of the social science of epistemic practices is to view 
epistemology as a research into how does  relevant (and eventually,  true) 
content get conceptualized and transmitted among humans.
Social epistemology is an enterprise that should be taken, we believe, 
as a sister-discipline to sociology of knowledge, cognitive anthropology and 
picoeconomics3.  As such,  its  normative epistemology is  a pragmatist  one, 
which  would  be  to  claim  it  begins  with  the  institutionalization  of  the 
experience  of  error4 that  shows  two  certainties  upon  which  a  scientific 
enterprise is built: first, that our beliefs are either true or false; and second,  
that we can never know in advance which of our beliefs will turn out to be 
false.  To be able to experience error is the prerequisite for the exercies of  
rationality5: for rationality, we could tentatively posit, should be defined taking 
one step backward from the phronetic hierarchy of appropriate behaviours 
towards a desired world, in order to present it as the very capacity to form 
such a phronetic system – in other words, to be rational is to be capable of  
changing  your  mind (according  to  new evidence).  This  is  the  pragmatist 
general  normative  epistemology  –  it  deflates  truth  (into  non-trivial 
instrumentality),  and delegates the epistemic responsibility to  the capacity 
and  capability  of  the  agent  itself.  Each  belief  entails  a  set  of  normative 
commitments, and therefore a responsibility for  material consequences of a 
3 The term 'social epistemology' will thus be used to refer to a wider program than was initially proposed by Goldman 
in  Goldman,  Knowledge  in  the  Social  World (Oxford:  Claredon  Press  1999).  Namely  social  epistemology as 
understood in this thesis would fall into the family of social sciences interested in the way humans become social 
through epistemic practices. Roughly put, we would use 'social epistemology' as a name of the discipline that regards 
sociality as the end-result of epistemic practices, as opposed to the strain of classical epistemology that regards truth  
as the end-result of epistemic practices. 
4 Brandom, "Knowing and Representing: The 2011 Munich Hegel Lectures", accessed 1.2.2015, 
http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/currentwork.html It must be noted that the experience of error in judgement when we 
realize that the stick that appears bent when under water is actually straight has to do with the judgement that we can 
do with it what we can do with a straight stick, and we cannot do with it what we can do with the bent stick. This is 
the normative commitment that allows for the experience of error to institute knowledge.
5 In effect, to account for our normative commitments.
certain belief.6 
Now, what does it mean to be an epistemological realist? It means that 
one claims that our epistemic practices embody the possibility of accessing 
reality. Reality is made of changes in the environment, and minds of our kind 
are capable of  tracking those changes (material consequences of a certain 
belief) to their benefits. (Now, "benefit" appears to be a problematic notion for 
many because it leads them to imagine some ultimate goal of the inquiry we 
are talking about. However, there need not be such an ultimate goal, and for 
all purposes there is none, when talking about a benefit for the population. 
The act of inquiry is, first of all, benefitial apriori, because it is a design of 
tools for the population for environmental manipulation, and any such tool is  
better than none. Secondly, it is benefitial because it is structured empirically,  
which  means it  is  a  self-correcting  enterprise,  and thus  is  insistent  upon 
upgrading tools once they prove to be incapable of handling the particular 
intrusions of  the world.)  While these changes in the environment may not 
have the identity the population has assigned to them, they are real changes 
in the real environment – the population uses them, via conceptualization, to 
its  benefit,  thus  instituting  Truth.  This  institution  requires:  a)  a  set  of 
normative commitments one is capable of making when assigning identity – if  
x is A then x is B; and b) the general commitment to change our mind when 
the thesis on identity proves wrong, when the mind experiences an error in 
judgement.
So,  there  are  reasons  to  believe  we  are  capable  of  tracking  the 
changes in  the evironment  (without  resorting to anti-naturalist  and idealist 
notions of mind-mirroring-nature) – it is only that we have to create certain 
webs of conceptualizations to do so. These conceptualizations remain valid 
(institutionalized) as long as the resistance of the world to them is low. Once 
the world  resists,  they must  be revised.  This  leads to  the enterprise  that 
posits that the claim A, the one we presently bet on, might be wrong, but we 
6 Brandom, "Knowing and Representing: The 2011 Munich Hegel Lectures", accessed 1.2.2015,  
http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/currentwork.html, 
know that claim B, the one we used to bet on, is wrong. As Sellars puts it, 
"One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which 
rests on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of the 
great Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where 
does  it  begin?).  Neither  will  do.  For  empirical  knowledge,  like  its  
sophisticated  extension,  science,  is  rational,  not  because  is  has  a  
foundation, but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put 
any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once."7
But,  most  importantly,  pragmatism is  naturalism.  The  most  succinct 
definition of the naturalistic programme in the social epistemology has been 
given  by  David  Bloor,  writing  about  the  naturalistic  programme  of  the 
sociology of knowledge, which again posits epistemic progress as organized 
by determinate negation8:
"Knowledge is a form of adaptation to the world and science is a form 
of collective adaptation. Scientific progress is real, but it can, and must, 
be understood as no more than adaptation, i.e. as a causal sequence 
of localized modifications prompted by shared goals and interests but 
with no 'ultimate'  goal.  Kuhn long ago pointed out  the analogy with  
biological evolution. Biological  evolution does not have a  telos.  The  
idea of progress that is relevant to science is of the same kind. It is  
always “progress - from” rather than “progress - to” – a move away from 
a problematic state of mal-adaptation, not a move toward an end-state 
of perfect adaptation. The analogy shows that progress can be real  
7 Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", in Science, Perception and Reality (Atascadero: Ridgeview 
Publishing Company, 1963), 170.
8 As put quite concisely by Brandom (Brandom, "Knowing and Representing: The 2011 Munich Hegel Lectures", 
accessed 1.2.2015,  http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/currentwork.html): "The determinateness of a thought or state of 
affairs (predicate or property) is a matter of its modally robust exclusion of other thoughts or states of affairs, those it 
is materially incompatible with."  
without being absolute."9
1.3. The Social, and the Theory of Semiotic Stakeholding
So,  social  epistemology  aims  at  a  descriptive  theory  of  agentive 
epistemic practices and agentive epistemic capacities that allow for the social 
to  emerge.  But  what  precisely  is  "the  social"?  It  is  the  occurence  of 
organization  between  organisms  that  could  be  classified  as  humans  that 
gives  rise  to  material  artefacts  (cultures)  which  significantly  improve  the 
survival  perspectives for  these organisms as well  as their  offspring.  What 
cultures,  in  turn,  show  is  that  humans  use  signs  to  communicate:  from 
language to traffic lights, from math to Grimes T-shirts. All these signs and 
sign systems enable the social to emerge – they enable the building of the 
houses,  management  of  roads,  organization  of  feeding,  articulation  of 
empathy, and so forth. So, for the theory of social to be derived, we need the 
theory of how does the agent become a sign user, and how does the sign-
using  lead  to  the  social.  And  this  theory  cannot  hinge  on  the 
phenomenological privilege, because it is unrenderable (we have no access 
into the black box, let alone black boxes), nor on conceptual (and semantic) 
determinism, because it is anti-naturalist (it posits reality as propositional). It 
must therefore be a theory of public manipulation of signs as the basis for the 
social.  This  is  a  methodological  requirement,  and  this  is  primarily  a 
methodological theory. It does not claim to be, in the strict sense, the truth of  
the social; it claims to be the best bet on how the social works, and the best 
bet  must  be informed in critical  ways by ontological  commitments  we are 
ready to make. It is a gathering of many different theoretical influences into a 
model of what would be the best way to imagine the agent and its semiotic  
traffic  if  one is  to  do  qualitative social  research – and when doing social 
9 Bloor, "Relativism and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge", in A Companion to Relativism, ed. Hales, Steven D. 
(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 449.  
research, one is inevitably doing a qualitative one at some point, if nothing 
because agents have an account of reasons for doing what they are doing. It  
would be a deeply unscientific move to render the agents' accounts of reason 
void by the mere fantasy of higher motivational structure. A social scientist, 
surely, must insist  in finding a bridge between what agents think they are 
doing and what are they not aware they are doing – however, a referral of the 
second part of this account to some biological determinism, absolute social 
pressure, or any other fundamentally idealist force will not suffice neither in 
its  explanatory nor  in  its  predictive capacity.  This  is  in  so many words a 
sketch of the task of exquisite difficulty that is the guiding of social science 
from  what  could  be  called  its  structural  phase  into  its  generative  phase 
(another name on offer could be populationist phase, but maybe naming a 
whole  phase  after  our  model  would  be  somewhat  distasteful)  –  in  other 
words,  from  the  perspective  of  the  'society'  as  a  system  of  habits  and 
institutions  to  the  perspective  of  the  social  as  a  creative  act  of  agents 
restricted by the creative acts of other agents. The particular danger in this 
change of perspective is the erasure of the habits and institutions (and their  
historical and social constraints) from the image of the social.  Both habits 
and institutions could be argued to be most relevant (even in the technical 
sense) social phenomena to the agents – this is why they work so hard to 
generate and maintain them – and the processes and reasons for this must 
be given by any viable social science. For while we might agree that "there is 
no such thing as a society" (as a given), there are certainly communities (as 
generated  and  maintained)  and  there  is,  more  to  the  point,  certainly  the 
social (as  the  fundamental  co-habitation  practice  of  humans  and,  as  its 
consequences,  one of  the founding aspects of  the human).  The atomistic 
programme, which would have posited the agent as non-historical, therefore 
would have posited it outside of its inherent epistemological "ground", which 
is,  to  put  it  bluntly,  other  agents,  and as we shall  see,  particularly,  other 
agents of its kind. Contemporary social science should not be merely agent-
based,  but  real-agent-based – and this  is  the enterprise we would like to 
contribute to.
The following thesis should be regarded as a kind of a methodological 
primer on populationist qualitative social research programme. The function 
of the model is to posit a set of assumptions explicitly shared by the scientific  
community. The model will be principally built by supplementing the (certain 
key aspects of) theory of Wilfrid Sellars by (certain key aspects of) relevance 
theory  of  Dan  Sperber  and  Deirdre  Wilson,  and  evenutally  by  the 
contribution  of  the  author  in  form  of  the  theoretical  figure  of  semiotic 
stakeholding,  added  in  order  to  account  for  both  the  emergence  of  the 
community and the restrictions on the space of reasons by the social. This 
will  all  be  drawn  out  through  the  ontology  of  populations.  The  model 
presented  is  largely  unoriginal,  and  combines  a  variety  of  well-known 
theoretical  figures  into  an image of  the  agent.  The  theoretical  figure  that 
could be said to be a novel tool in the present thesis is the figure of semiotic  
stakeholding, towards which the whole model builds. It is a methodological 
tool  which,  we  believe  will  enable  both  a  simpler  and  a  more  legitimate 
discussion and research into the social situations, and allow for the possibility 
of trans-situational judgements.
We will first present populations as an ontological form of both agents 
and signs in order to  have a clear understanding of  what  is the absolute 
ontological  commitment  of  our  model.  Then we will  present  the theory of 
agents and signs, starting from the general anatomy of agent (its most robust  
structure), and then telling the story of its development into an agent, and the 
rise of the social it allows for, that will account for communication, cognition, 
self  and semiotic  stakeholding.  The last  part  will  examine implications for 
social research. 
2. Populations: The Ontological Commitment
The theory of evolution is one of the greatest achievements in human 
understanding of  the natural  world.  If  the theory of  evolution can be very 
roughly stated as an account of non-teleological production of both ontical 
(individuals) and ontological (kinds) varieties, it marks the official inauguration 
of the idea that has been haunting the humanity for ages, but has never until  
then been the sole explanatory mechanism for such a large-scale field: that 
there is no blueprint in some other world for what takes ontologically and, 
even  more  to  the  point,  ontically  place  in  this  one.  Now,  this  idea  might 
appear quite commonsensical to many, but it is such merely as a statement.  
It is much more difficult to understand it as a programme, because it is a very 
usual inclination among humans (and as we will try to show, something of a 
neccessity for all agent behaviour) to actually deal with particular objects as 
instances of general terms. This is so for, at least, two reasons: firstly due to 
the nature of our language which uses general terms for particular objects 
and  influences  our  conceptualizations  (which  is  something  that  will  be 
explained later  on),  and secondly because we must make approximations 
about the environment in order to manipulate it. The very establishment of 
these two contraints is marked by a strong approximation and generalization: 
it is a statement on human agents as if they share properties which make 
them susceptible to these constraints. This is very awkward, and this very 
awkwardness  is  something  that  will  be  dealt  with  throught  the  notion  of 
populations. So on one side we have agentive properties because of which 
the hard anti-essentialist  programme is unsustainable – the very notion of  
agentive  properties  makes  it  unsustainable;  and  on  the  other  side,  any 
empirical glance will make the hard anti-essentialism of the world quite clear. 
Both of these things are facts, and neither of them are to be taken lightly if  
one  is  doing  social  science:  humans  not  only  make  but  gather  around  
representations of the world, and each human has a different representation  
of the world. The first step towards the resultion of this tension lies with the 
adoption of what Ernst Mayr named the populationist thinking: 
“All  organisms  and  organic  phenomena  are  composed  of  unique 
features  and  can  be  described  collectively  only  in  statistical  terms. 
Individuals, or any kind of organic entities, form populations of which 
we  can  determine  only  the  arithmetic  mean  and  the  statistics  of 
variation.  Averages  are  merely  statistical  abstractions;  only  the 
individuals of which populations are composed have reality."10 
To understand it better, let us differentiate it from the typological thinking, its  
precise opposite:
"The ultimate conclusions of the population thinker and of the typologist 
are precisely the opposite. For the typologist, the type (eidos) is real 
and  the  variation  an  illusion,  while  for  the  populationist  the  type 
(average) is an abstraction and only the variation is real.“11
Populations are a theoretical figure developed to handle the complexity 
of empirical reality, in which the natural world cannot be described as a copy 
of some more real yet super-natural order of things, but has to understood in 
terms of  particulars changing in the environment of  particulars as well  as 
changing the environment of particulars. 
However,  the  scientific  enterprise  is  constructed  to  meet  the  call  to 
explain and predict, and in the case of social sciences, to explain and predict 
the  certain  behaviours  of  the  certain  agents.  The  hard  anti-esstentialist 
programme is equally non-scientific as is the essentialist, because it cannot 
go any further in trying to say something about the world then merely positing 
that  everything is  a particular.  And yet,  it  does have a point  – everything 
10 Mayr, Evolution and the Diversity of Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1997), 28, my italics
11 Mayr, Evolution and the Diversity of Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1997), 28
really is a particular. 
The way out seems to rest in the practice of modelling. The researcher, 
so to speak, has to engineer the illusion which will enable her to speak of the 
world; and in doing this, she must at all times keep in mind that this is an 
illusion, and that there are aspects of the particulars that have been occluded 
by the choice of the specific illusion.  Models can be many things in many 
different  contexts,  and  are  mostly  tailored  according  to  the  needs  of  the 
specific scientific community which judges their worth by the ability to meet 
those needs. We will not list the needs that we see as having to be met in the 
community of the social science – they will become apparent with our choice 
of modelling points – but we will say that what any model for the qualitative 
research in social sciences has to account for are the agents and the strange 
ability of human beings to transform neurochemical events inside their heads 
into public events of particular diversity,  usefulness and detail,  as well  as,  
evenutally, "why are some representations more successful than others"12.
The model we will present in this thesis is the model of the social as a 
result of negotiation between agents. In order to construct this model we will 
have  to  develop  a  series  of  sub-models,  namely  of  the  agent  and  the 
mechanisms that are involved in its development and the generation of its 
behaviour, as well as of the situation as the locus of the research. We will 
thus 'engineer' an abstraction that we see as the best bet given the data and 
the needs of the research. This abstraction will have at least two aspects that  
give it credibility in the face of populationist reality. First, it is an agent-based 
account of the social – meaning it already tries to deal with the populations of 
agents. Second, it is an attempt to develop a model of the social along the 
lines of something we might roughly call naturalist semiotics, which at least 
means that something that folk semiotics call 'meaning' changes with each 
transmission  of  sign-designs  that  'signify'  it  –  and  thus  it  deals  with 
populations of signs. The image of the social we present is the image of the 
12  Sperber, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach (Oxford: Blackwell 1996).
populations of human agents (human organisms) manipulating populations of 
signs  (material  events,  be  it  neurochemical  or  environmental)  among 
populations of non-human agents that affect both the population of human 
agents  and  the  populations  of  signs,  as  well  as  the  populations  of 
manipulations.  It  is  a  complicated  image  that  has  to  be  reduced  to  an 
abstraction in order to be manipulable – for a researcher is, after all, nothing 
but  another  agent  and  as  such  needs  to  have  its  images  of  the  world 
manipulable.  Our  model  will  be  developed  in  order  to  be  useable  for 
qualitative social research. It does not claim useability in any other domain.
2.1. Populations of Agents
With respect  to  agents,  the populationist  approach means that  each 
agent  is  a  singular  event  in  the  environment,  despite  being  able  to  be 
regarded as  a  member  of  a  certain  population.  More distinctily,  it  means 
agent can be regarded as member of a number of populations: the social 
situation one is  researching (from now on to be called:  a situation) being 
possibly one as well. 
With  respect  to  social,  the  populationist  approach  effectively  means 
there is no social but what is emergent from agentive behaviour. This means 
all  the  transcendentalist  and  idealist  accounts  of  the  social  have  to  be 
revisited with special attention to usage of explanatory  tools which refer to 
some other kind of a thing that is not a human agent (an individual human 
organism) in attributing qualities of relevant decision-making within the social. 
We believe, however, that the majority of them can be easily revised by using 
the model we are presenting, because mechanisms ("the ghosts") they are 
referring to can be translated into semiotic stakeholdings, enabling clearer 
view of agents' reasons and behaviours13. 
13 For instance, every notion of the vague conceptual entity that is "capitalism" in recent cultural studies literature 
could surely be broken down into specific actions of specific agents for specific reasons, or it designates nothing.
Some vocabularies  are better  then  others  in  accounting  for  certain 
phenomena. In dealing with the social, it is our belief that vocabularies with,  
so to speak, more ghosts are the less better among the vocabularies, for it  
seems an obvious mistake to account for social events without referral  to 
reasons,  decision-making  and  behaviour  of  particular  human beings  in  a 
particular situation, or with referral to those activities as if these people were 
behaving under a spell of some larger, looming architecture of biological or 
social "rationality". Human society is not populated by either memes or Geist, 
it is populated by people, who are a organisms that behave in probable ways. 
Which among these ways are more probable has shown itself to be a difficult  
question, primarily because it  is difficult to have an insight into  the mutual  
cognitive environment (MCE) of a large amount of people. This has, in turn, 
proven  difficult  primarily  because  large  amounts  of  people  share  a  very 
improverished  MCE,  and  at  that  one  information  from which  they largely 
regard  as  less  relevant  that  those  from  the  MCE  shared  with  closer 
communities.  Probabilities  of  behaviour  can  be  accounted  for  in  various 
ways, and it is not our intention to claim our is the only one nor that it should 
be used solely. However, it appears to us that the MCEs shared with closer 
communities (and at  that,  populations) require a reading that  can only be 
delivered by somebody capable of  sharing that  MCE, given the proposed 
non-demonstrative complexity of  MCE (effectively,  the fact that people are 
capable of following rules and holding assumption they cannot neccessarily 
explicate).  Non-demonstrative  complexity  of  MCE  means  that  the  only  
access  to  it  is  by  negotiation  on  the  the  determination  of  the  sign.  This 
access is not absolute, but it seems to us it is the only that can be considered 
legitimate. This means probability, in many relevant cases of organizational 
decision-making  (from  policy-making  to  conflict-resolution),  cannot  be 
sufficiently well predicted without the interpretation of the social situation one 
is  inevitably  intervening  with.  Even  if  one  is  to  proceed  in  a  largely 
quantitative fashion, the argument from MCE would have it,  one needs to 
establish the categories with regard to the population one researches. 
Populationist approach, also, is significantly a middle-level approach: it 
accounts  for  social  situations  primarily,  and  speculates  on  certain  trans-
situational variables subsequently. It is middle-level also in the sense that it  
takes information from both cognitive sciences and large-scale quantitative 
social research, and incorporates them critically into the reading of the social  
situation  which  for  reasons  of  its  own  definition  cannot  be  explained  by 
reduction  either  to  neurochemical  events  or  to  statistical  probabilities  – 
because neither of those provide reasons for behaviour, and it is unscientific 
to  neglect  reasons  of  particular  agents  when  accounting  for  the  social  
situation. 
Trans-situational  and  trans-populational  judgement  is  in  effect 
prediction. The problem with prediction in human populations is something 
we might call "ceteris paribus problem", namely the problem with the fact that 
more changes count  than can be tracked.  Qualitative research assists  in 
raising the probability of "successful" trans-situational judgement simply by 
being capable of sharing the MCE, and therefore being capable of assuming 
values to changes (namely, which changes will be considered relevant by the 
population).
2.2. Populations of Signs
Sign  in  our  use  of  the word  refers  to  both  the  material  sign-design 
(something we will later call ostentation-design) and to the conceptualization 
of a certain phenomenon that it is designed to, so to speak, point to. To be 
more  precise,  it  refers  to  the  event  in  a  cognitive  environment  (a  set  of 
assumptions about the environment the agent is capable of making) that is a 
synthetic intervention into that evironment that  consists of  the ostentation-
design and the set of inferences expected by the user of the sign to be made 
by the ones the sign is being transmitted to.
With respect to signs, populationist approach means that each agent 
Y's use of sign A is distinct not only from the other agents' usage of them but 
also from its own (Y's) other uses of the sign (A). Signs are populations of 
their  uses,  and  accordingly,  in  each  of  agent's  brains  form  a  unevenly 
distributed  network  of  proper  uses  in  accordance  with  the  prototype 
negotiated in the situation or a group of situations.
The distribution of signs, whatever their macro-effect, is in naturalist's 
eyes  always  the  result  of  the  transimissions  of  signs  between  individual 
human agents, and as such it is in constant transmission14. There is no stable 
distribution of signs – this would in effect mean the signs are not being used,  
and are therefore no longer signs at all.
One  of  the  most  important  points  to  this  conceptualization  of  sign-
distribution is that in every transimission, the sign being transmitted changes 
– at least because it 'enters' a new conceptual scheme. What one must keep 
in mind is that every time the sign is called back in a single agent's 'brain', it  
enters a new conceptual  scheme as well.  Each new use of  the sign is a 
translation. The problem in this respect is obvious: how does one know what 
a sign 'means' to the agent in question in the situation in question? This is the 
question that has to be resolved on site, with tools of discrimination offered 
by this model. It will also be revisited after we present the model. 
14 Sperber, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
3. Agents, Signs and the Social: A Model
3.1. The General Anatomy of the Human Agent
The definition of an agent is: it which does. And what is "does" is that it  
changes what the other agents do. In doing this, agent's particular behaviour 
cannot be treated as either determinate or indeterminate – it  can only be 
treated as probable given the threefold anatomy of the environmental event 
that  is  the  agent:  its  biological  and  sociological  given,  its  performative 
reasoning  and  the  desired  world,  and  the  vague  points  of  its  receptive, 
inferential and expressive powers.
But first, a disclaimer.
This changing knows no kinds-speech: any possible agent changes the 
doing of any other possible agent – namely, human agents exert influence 
over non-human agents, and vice versa. 
However, the focus of our approach is going to be a human agent. This 
is so not  only because the qualitative research of  social  situations is,  we 
claim, to the largest extent research into particular agents in that situations, 
but because all social situations are different than other kinds of situations 
due to the presence of human agents. One could argue, and many do15, that 
there are other agents beside human individuals in the social day-to-day. This 
appears to be completely true. Communities are agents, interest groups are 
agents, ecological factors are agents, even things are agents. All this must 
be  taken  deeply  into  account;  and  the  understanding  of  the  social  will  
become  much  more  successful  with  better  understading  of  non-human 
agents' import to the social situation. However, while the non-human agents 
are  important  when  it  comes  to  understanding  the  agent's  cognitive 
15 In particular, Bruno Latour has been quite successful at pointing it out, even though we wouldn't neccessarily, to 
continue our gambling metaphors, "put our money" on the theoretical body of work under his label of "actor-network 
theory". See Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005).
environment and physical environment, in which the non-human agents are 
strongly agentive, one must never lose sight of the fact that the focus of the  
social researcher's research is the human agent. Social is certainly emergent 
of many other factors beside the human agent – ecological the least – but it  
is  emergent  of  these  factors  via  their  negotiation  with  the  human agent. 
Without  the human agent  in the picture,  these would be non-human, and 
therefore non-social,  events on planet Earth. It  is the human agent that is 
their differentia specifica. 
Equally,  when  it  comes  to  the  case  of  interest  groups  and  alike 
communities,  one  must  see  that  these  are  no  more  then  populations  of 
human agents distributed according to their semiotic stakeholdings, which is 
something we will try to make sense of later on. The reasons and goals of 
interest  groups  are events in the agentive world,  but  a researcher cannot 
properly understand them without referral to the reasons and goals of the 
human agents that make up those groups, or communities. However, if an 
agent  Y is  being researched,  in  whose cognitive environment  the interest 
group Z plays a certain agentive role, then it may be of no consequence to 
the researcher to form an understanding proper of Z, for it is only important in 
the context of the Y's world, and has to excavated as a sign in Y's world, for 
aside from particular agents that form Z, its only causal role is in its existence 
as a sign.
But before explicating what is a sign and what does it  mean to hold 
semiotic stakes, our model needs an account of the neccessary form for the 
environmental event that is the human agent, which we will call its "general 
anatomy". Also, wherever the distinction is not relevant to the point, we will 
refer to the human agent as an agent.
The general anatomy of the human agent is threefold. 
Firstly,  the  agent  is  a  singular  amalgam of  its  biological  and  social 
contingencies. (The difference between biological and social is the informal 
difference in time frames. All  social  is  surely biological  – however, for  the 
sake of distinguishing between what organism receives as an input during its 
life and what organism comes with into life in form of actual properties or 
dispositions, we could call the former social and the latter biological. A certain 
percent  of  the  biological  can be said  to  be a  sediment  of  social  through 
generations of the population which preceded the organism in question.) It is 
a certain organism, with certain physical traits and cognitive resources, and it 
is thrown into a certain social world, where certain social institutions, habits 
and practices are already in place. All these contingencies, to a point, shape 
and inform its agentive proceedings; and in assessing these contingencies, 
the researcher should be informed by all the sciences and disciplines at her 
disposal, but keep in mind that each agent is a singular amalgam of all of its 
conditions. 
Secondly, the agent can account for its performative reasoning and an 
informed  design  of  the  desired  world.  The  agent  has  limited  and  flawed 
knowledge of what it can do to change the behaviour of other agents – but it 
must  do  something,  and  it  makes  the  decision  (the  choice)  of  doing 
something  using  whatever  limited  and  flawed  knowledge  it  has  at  its 
disposal16.  Agent can account for what it  see as available and appropriate 
tools  for  manipulating  the  signs  and  thus  the  other  agents,  which  is 
something  we  will  call  its  performative reasoning,  and  can  account  for  a 
synthetic  and  particular  purpose  (overall  and  situational  goals)  of  this 
manipulation,  which  is  something  we  will  call  its  desired  world.  To  put  it 
bluntly, agent can account for what is does and why it does it. This account 
will always be flawed and limited as well, and it is precisely this, so to speak, 
epistemic  scarcity that  drives the agent  towards behaviour,  and without  it 
there would be no agents. This scarcity,  it  must be stressed here already, 
goes  both  inside  and  outside  –  the  agent  makes  hypotheses  about  its 
16 (I can see there is something solid coming my way at a speed probably damaging to my body, but I don't know what 
it is. Does the lack of knowledge on the identity of what is rushing towards me make me question, to a relevant degree,  
whether to move out of its way?)
environment, but also about itself. Its mental processes are something that  
has  to  conceptualized  with  the  same  tools  it  uses  to  conceptualize  the 
outside world, and are something that suffer the same fate as the outside 
world in the process of conceptualization.  
Thirdly,  the  agent  is  a  host  of  ambiguities  with  regard  to  both  its 
receptive,  inferential  and  expressive  powers.  Receptively,  the  agent 
misrepresents both itself and the environment. This is not so because there 
is some real environment that the agent fails to represent, but because both 
the evironment and itself  are unfinished through the present situation.  We 
must  note here that  the agent's image of  both environment and itself  are 
total,  in  the  sense  that  they are  manipulable.  At  the  certain  threshold  of 
manipulability,  the  agent  does  not  care  about  information  which  will  not 
significantly  improve  this  manipulability.  (Ofcourse,  the  degrees  of 
manipulability  vary according  to  the  needs  –  the  scientist  needs  a  much 
higher degree of manipulability of signs for phenomena which she studies 
than the agent that does not study them.) This leaves room for an abundance 
of mistakes, errors, blind spots and environmental intrusions to, so to speak, 
glitch  the  agent's  reasoning  and  its  behavioural  choices,  as  well  as  its 
conceptualization  and  its  design  of  the  desired  world.  One  among  many 
interesting takes on this  aspect  of  the agent,  and from a social  scientific 
viewpoint particularly tantalizing, is derived from the area of picoeconomics, 
which  studies,  roughly  put,  the  discrepancies  between  competing 
neuroeconomic "events" in the agents, as well as the discrepancies between 
the competing neuroeconomic "events" and eventual agent's decisions. Their 
findings are very interesting with respect to the vague points:
"(...) if we model individual neurons or groups of neurons as economic 
agents, they appear to compute optima under budget constraints; but 
the optima in question are relative to their  utility functions rather than 
the utility function of  the person they 'serve'.  A given equilibrium in  
interactions among neurons may thus fail to correspond to equilibrium 
in the game being played by the person."17
Expressively,  the  agent  uses  highly  ambiguous  tools  to  manipulate  other 
agents  –  the  most  obvious  example  of  this  can  be  found  in  the  use  of 
language as a play with signs as  general  items,  which means they leave 
room for the listener to complete their prototype18-based extension, which is 
something we will  also  come back to later  on when we elaborate on the 
notion  of  semiotic  stakeholding.  For  now,  let  us  state  it  obviously:  the 
semiotic mutations, which are a constant in all semiotic traffic, neccessitate  
evernew negotiations in the social situations, and are therefore, among other  
changes in the environment, one of the prime generator of social situations. 
However, it must be noted that while the agent, obviously, is ignorant of the 
identity of, we could call them, ambiguity points, it is not neccessarily, or even 
usually,  ignorant of their  existence19.  Along with specificities of the agent's 
account  of  the  environment  and  itself,  and  with  the  proceedings  in  the 
negotiational space, the agent's economy of its vague points (how does it  
handle what it knows it doesn't know) is the third most interesting focus of all  
qualitative agent-based social research.
The third aspect of the agent, what we have called vague points, can, 
however, become apparent only with respect to the first two. Therefore, it is 
crucial for a researcher to create a clear image of the biological and social 
contingencies  of  the  agents  in  the  social  situation,  as  well  as  elicit  the 
expression  of  their  theories  of  self,  others,  signs  (as  behaviour-changing 
tools) at their disposal, and their desired world. The agent conveys flawed 
17 Ross, "The economics of the sub-personal: two research programs", in Economics and the Mind, ed. Montero and 
White (London: Routledge, 2007), 45, author's italics
18 Prototype theory, as a principle of organizing categories around structured attributes of clear cases for reasons of  
cognitive economy, is originally presented as such by Eleanor Rosch, even though similar theoretical contributions 
are many,  most  notably by Wittgenstein's  theory of  family resemblance.  See D'Andrande,  The Development  of  
Cognitive Anthropology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 118.
19 (My ignorance of the identity of the thing that is coming towards me in high speed will only strenghten my belief that 
I have to get out of its way.)
and limited knowledge by flawed and limited means, and is unaware of all the 
consequences or roots of either the formation or transmission of these signs,  
and yet it uses them to not only manipulate, but in many cases, successfully 
manipulate other agents. Therefore, the agent is not to be patronized by the 
focus on the vague points – yet something crucial about the social situation 
one is researching is to be learned from them.
What we have seen so far is something of an aposteriori neccessary 
form of the human agent. It is neccessary with respect to the empirical facts:  
humans are organisms born into a certain social world, equipped with certain 
powers  to  handle  this  social  to  a  verying  degree,  have  a  sensation  of 
choosing between the proper and improper behaviour of other agents and of 
choosing  between  various  means  of  changing  or  maintaining  these 
behaviours,  and  make mistakes  in  both  representing  and conveying  their 
representations of the world. No more, it appears to us, but also no less, can 
be said of the general anatomy of what we call a human agent. All human 
agents  share  these  formal  characteristics  despite  the  fact  that  they  are 
different from each other in all possible ways. One could, however, argue that 
there  are  non-human  agents  that  share  this  anatomy.  This,  as  we  have 
noted, is not  our concern,  and therefore cannot be used as an argument 
against this view. The general anatomy of the human agent is not claimed to 
be its differentia specifica. 
We will now proceed to model the development of the agent, and the 
founding of the social.
3.2. The Development of the Agent and the Founding of the Social
3.2.1.           Communication  
Our account of the develoment of the agent and the social will begin at 
the crossroad between two distinct theories of communication. The first one, 
code-based theory of communication, is something of folk semiotics, and it 
presents the communication as a transmission of the message via signs from 
one  cognitive  apparatus  to  the  other.  The  second  one,  inference-based 
theory of communication, presents the communication as a process in which 
one participant  gives evidence from which the other  participant  infers the 
message20. We will opt for the second one, for two reasons. Firstly, because 
there  appear  to  be  numerous  cases  of  communication  without  pre-
established code. Secondly, because the relationship between the code and 
the  message  does  not  appear  to  be  as  clear  cut  in  the  'mind'  of  one 
participant, let alone two or many. This must not be taken to mean that there 
are no signs in communication, it must be taken to mean that signs are an 
upgrading of the communication, and, at that,  we will  claim, an upgrading 
towards the social. The "bottom line" of the communication, however, will be 
taken  to  be  what  Dan Sperber  and  Deirdre  Wilson  in  their  seminal  work 
Relevance: Communication and Cognition have described as something we 
could  call  "ostentation-and-relevance-management"  theory  of 
communication.
Human agents  try  to  manipulate  the  attention  of  other  agents,  and 
expect them to discern according to the relevance principle the message this 
manipulation  'conveys'.  This  manipulation  is  ostentation,  the  "behaviour 
which makes manifest an intention to make something manifest"21. At making 
x  manifest,  and  making  it  manifest  that  it  intends  to  make  x  manifest, 
ostentation, according to Sperber and Wilson, also creates expectations of 
20 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Cambrdige: Blackwell, 1986), 1-15.
21 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Cambrdige: Blackwell, 1986), 49.
optimal relevance, partly due to the effort by the agent doing the ostentation, 
and partly due to the other agent's natural inclination towards searching for 
relevance in the ostentive behaviour of other agents. Despite this promise, 
the ostentation is still being judged, and whether it will be fruitful depends on 
how relevant it turns out to be to the other participant. And how relevant it is 
basically  means  that  it  results  in  the  greatest  cognitive  effect  with  least 
cognitive effort. 
"In relevance-theoretic terms, an input is relevant to an individual when 
its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a POSITIVE 
COGNITIVE  EFFECT.  A  positive  cognitive  effect  is  a  worthwhile  
difference to the individual’s representation of the world (...)"22
This specific account of communication, much simplified for our present 
purposes, hinges on a concept of cognitive environment.
"A cognitive environment  is  merely a set  of  assumptions which the  
individual is capable of mentally representing and accepting as true.  
The question then is:  which of these assumptions will  the individual  
actually make? This question is of interest not only to the psychologist, 
but also to every ordinary communicator. We will argue that when you 
communicate,  your intention is to alter  the cognitive environment of  
your addressees;  but  of  course  you  expect  their  actual  thought  
processes to be affected as a result."23
Ostentation  as  the  bearer  of  communication  is  a  viable  theoretical 
figure only if communication is not the conveyance of precise "meanings", but 
a change of the cognitive environment.  And this change can come about in 
22 Sperber and Wilson, "Relevance Theory", in The Handbook of Pragmatics, ed. Horn and Ward (Oxford: Blackwell,
2004), 608.
23 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Cambrdige: Blackwell, 1986), 46.
approximate accordance with the intention of the agent doing the ostentation 
with a much larger degree of probability if there is an overlap between the 
cognitive environments of those involved in the communication, if they can be 
said to share a mutual cognitive environment (MCE). 
"When a cognitive environment we share with other people is mutual, 
we have evidence about what is mutually manifest to all of us. Note that 
this  evidence can never  be conclusive:  the boundaries of  cognitive  
environments  cannot  be  precisely  determined,  if  only  because  the  
threshold between very weakly manifest assumptions and inaccessible 
ones is unmarked."24
MCE is a theoretical figure that posits agents as treating utterances as 
environmental events (and at that events that call for special attention), and 
is therefore (if we posit the agent as the change in the environment) capable 
of telling the story of agent's sign-usage as its way of using those signs as 
environmental variables in the ontologically same way it is using a hammer 
for hitting a nail. This also implies the remainder of Heidegger's account of 
using a hammer until it breaks25, and breaking of the hammer as a way into 
its  modality  (which  could  be  called  "understanding"  the  hammer,  and 
effectively presents know-that as a subset of know-how) – namely, it implies 
that  we learn to use signs through the negotiation with the environmental 
bearers of the value of those signs, which are other agents, due to the signs 
usually "breaking" (the constancy of semiotic mutation). The other aspect of 
this  story  is  that  reflection  (and  therefore,  demonstratively  intentional 
behaviour,  as  opposed to  non-demonstratively intentional  behaviour  which 
occurs "before" the handling of the signs) is a byproduct of sign-use, which is  
something that will be discussed later on.  
24 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Cambrdige: Blackwell, 1986), 45.
25 Heidegger, Being and Time, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 68.
In  order  to  at  this  point  elaborate  on  leaving  questions  traditionally 
known as semantic aside, for they are none of our concern in understanding 
the social goings-on, we must make clear that this is not to say they are of no 
concern to understanding any social goings-on. To be as precise as possible 
concerning  semantic  problems  that  we  will  mostly  disregard  in  this  first 
attempt at the model, we claim that any semantic story that is possible to be 
accounted  for  under  the  specific  pragmatic  story  we  are  enganged  in 
modelling is a more possible semantic  story than the one that  cannot  be 
accounted for under it; however, we do not claim that the semantic story's 
possibility  to  be  accounted  for  under  the  specific  pragmatic  story  is  the 
criteria  for  choosing  the  best  semantic  story  among  those  that  can  be 
accounted  for  under  the  specific  pragmatic  story  –  their  quality  is  to  be 
judged on other basis, which we will not be concerning ourselves with. 
In  effect,  our  account  of  discursive practice  claims that  holophrastic 
"food"  'means'  "I  am hungry and  you  have  been feeding  me,  therefore  I 
expect you to feed me again" – it does not denote the object that is 'food', but  
demands  attention  to  convey  an  appeal  to  a  certain  practice  using  an 
ostentation-design (in this case the 'name' of a thing, which is a semantic 
issue of the system of interdependant ostentation-designs, since pointing at 
food and saying "food" convey the same 'message', or, in this case 'appeal').  
This view of  discursive practice  is  modelled to  be of  use primarily to  the 
qualitative social scientist, because it enables her to view discursive practices 
as manipulations  of  environment  (in  the discursive cases,  primarily social 
environment, but non-social as well), but is a legitimate philosophical view of 
doing something by saying as a precedent for saying something, that could 
be translated in our parlance by claiming that  the utterances (a sign) is an  
endorsment  of  pattern  of  inferences,  and  therefore  effectively  the  
aknowledging  (and  nomination)  of  a  certain  MCE  (a  certain  set  of  
assumptions) in order to change it. 
The evidence of what is mutually manifest to all of us, as well as the 
subsequent  account  of  assumptions,  are  non-demonstratively  complex26. 
This is partially because they either cannot be clearly conceptualized or (as 
we will see, basically the same thing) articulated (we cannot, so to speak, 
"put our finger on it"), or because they can be conceptualized, which means 
they are articulated into signs. An ostentation-design that repeats itself in a 
community  in  a  certain  population  of  situations  leads  towards  an 
establishment of something we will call a sign. The idiomatic structure of sign 
is27:
If (change in the MCE) A then (change in the MCE) B;
where  A stands  for  the  ostentive  behaviours  (ostentation-design),  and  B 
stands for the change in behaviour on part  of  the affected agent  given A 
(idiomatic manipulation). The further speculation would posit that all signs are 
stored  under  B,  thus  available  from  the  standpoint  of  their  behaviour-
changing  potentials.  We  call  this  structure  of  sign  idiomatic  because  it 
exhibits traits similar to what is known as an idiom in linguistics: a phrase that 
cannot be understood by understanding the meanings of its elements. In the 
same  vein,  the  agent  has  at  its  disposal  only  situations  at  which  the 
ostentation occured and was successful,  and has to infer  the sign as the 
relation between ostentation, situation and success in such a way as to make 
it available in other situations. Sign-management (and language as one of its 
most prominent variants) is, according to our model of the agent, learned and 
used idiomatically. It must be noted here that this view of semiotic education 
does not present the agent as a blank slate, merely as an empiricist with a 
26 This is why only an another agent can recognize them, and a machine in a classical sense, cannot. (At this point, AI 
and cyborg possibilities cannot be accounted for, but there is no apriori impossibility of success.)
27 To repeat and somewhat add to a point we already noted, we must insist on making clear the following: this is the 
structure of the sign from the standpoint of qualitative social research, not from the standpoint of linguistics, nor any 
other detailed account of semiotics with regards to cognitive processes.  Namely, a sign (unit  of which is to be  
discriminated  on  research  site)  certainly has  many more  properties  but  ones we are  explicating presently.  For 
instance, words surely do create some kind of representations – however, they are our concern only within limits  
explicated by this thesis. Outside those limits, at least at this point of the development of the model, the story of the 
sign can go any way as long as the provisions noted in this text are taken into account. 
special advantage, which is something we will return to later when we focus 
on the issue of conceptualization. For now it might be enough to postulate 
that using signs is immensly cognitively and socially beneficial for the agents, 
which is a motivational push that should not be taken lightly.
Given the  intrinsically public  nature  of  its  ostentation-design,  sign is 
something that  is  not  only mutally manifest  to  all  of  us,  but  has a strong 
influence on the level of the expectations of relevance due to its possibility to  
tie the agent that is using the sign to the community of users of that particular  
sign. To understand this, let us once again make clear:
"We want to suggest that the communicator's informative intention is 
better described as an intention to modify directly not the thoughts but 
the cognitive environment of the audience. The actual cognitive effects 
of a modification of the cognitive environment are only partly 
predictable. Communicators -like human agents in general- form 
intentions over whose fulfilment they have some control: they can have 
some controllable effect on their audience's cognitive environment, 
much less on their audience's actual thoughts, and they form their 
intentions accordingly."28
It is the change in the MCE that comes with a promise of relevance, 
which is signalled by the agent doing the ostentation in the manner it infers to 
be  appropriate,  given  its  knowledge  of  the  MCE.  And  if  one  of  the 
assumptions available to it is that the other agents will recognize the signs it  
is  using,  the  assumption  that  the  use  of  these  signs  has  significant 
ostentation-boosting potential is more or less immediately following. On the 
other side, ostentation-boosting potentials of signs are available dominantly 
due to the fact that their idiomatic structures play exactly the role of lowering 
cogntive effort for a certain cognitive effect. But this is not the only reason 
28  Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Cambrdige: Blackwell, 1986), 66.
signs have the ostentation-boosting potentials – the one we are interested in 
is that the use of signs signals membership to a certain social world. 
3.2.2.           Conceptualization  
To conceptualize an x is to make is manipulable at will – to make it a 
sign.  We  are  capable  of  conceptualizing  a  sentence  "Bachelor  is  an 
unmarried human male". We can imagine all the relevant elements of this 
sentence, and connect these images into a whole that stands in some kind of 
truth relation to the utterance. We however cannot clearly define "unmarried", 
"human" or "male". Some of us, you could argue, can. The consensus about 
these definitions is somewhat difficult  to expect.  But even if  there were a 
consensus, and a group od people could define the elements in the same 
fashion,  two  things  would  still  hold  as  true:  first,  the  elements  of  their  
definition would need new defining and this would basically go on forever; 
and second, and more to the point, this would not make this group more able  
to  use the sentences in question. They could use it in certain situations in 
which somebody who had no access to these clear definitions could not; but  
this would not make the sentence in question unusuable to the uninitiated 
group,  merely  usable  in  fewer  contexts.  We  use  those  concepts  (any 
concepts) without much trouble without having a clear definition or content 
present as long as they  work,  meaning specifically as long as we do not  
dispute someone's use of them or somebody disputes ours.  What we have 
instead of a definition is an idiomatic strategy – this set of signs hangs well  
here and can be used as a stimuli for this other set of signs, unless there is  
evidence to the contrary. This evidence to the contrary is of crucial value to 
the  user  in  the  process  of  learning  how to  use  signs,  and  thus  how to 
conceptualize. However, if somebody uses the word wrongly, we don't say 
this person doesn't have a concept of this word – we say this person used 
the  word  wrongly,  that  she  tied  the  wrong  manipulation  (a  set  of  public 
behaviours) to the particular ostentation-design (public word). 
But let us go pause here and admit  that we have snuck in way too 
many implicit premises in our account of conceptualization. We have to now 
make them explicit, and in doing this we will mostly be using Sellars' theory of  
something we might call functionalist semiotics, which we believe goes hand 
in hand with Sperber and Wilson's  ostentation-and-relevance management 
theory  of  communication  in  ways  that  we  hope  will  become clear  in  our 
presentation.
Sellars begins his exposition by famously attacking something he refers 
to  as  the  Myth  of  the  Given.  'Given'  in  Sellars'  parlance,  and  in  certain 
philosophical circles, stands for non-conceptual knowledge. Namely, it stands 
for the idea that I am capable of seeing x as x without having a concept of x. 
This leads to a strange proposition that  we are capable of  sensing facts, 
most clearly made explicit in the following "inconsisten triad": 
"A. X senses red sense content S entails X knows noninferentially that 
s is red.
B. The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired.
C. The ability to know facts of the form x is 0 is acquired.
A and B together entail not-C; B and C together entail not-A; A and C 
together entail not-B. "29
Sellars chooses to discard A. The reason for this maybe most clearly 
put by Ray Brassier:
"To say that we sense facts is to say that sensation mirrors a reality 
29 Brassier, "Nominalism, Naturalism, and Materialism: Sellars's Critical Ontology", in Contemporary Philosophical 
Naturalism and Its Implications, ed. Bashour and Muller (New York: Routledge, 2014), 103.
already endowed with propositional form. But propositional form is 
tantamount to intelligible order. How then are we to explain the 
congruence between sensible order and intelligible order? If the ability 
to sense facts is unacquired, it cannot be explained naturalistically in 
terms of evolution by natural selection. Thus the congruence between 
sensible order and intelligible order must either be left unexplained or 
explained by invoking supernatural factors."30
In other words, the choice is grounded in naturalist tendencies, which 
must do away with human epistemic privilege in the natural world. We do not 
have immediate access to reality no more than any other agent – and the 
reality cannot be structured as to fit uniquely with our cognitive infrastructure.  
However, we are capable of making use of reality, as are other agents. This 
is something that must be explained, and we will articulate the explanation 
somewhat differently than Sellars, but in the same vein, and we will in the 
end arrive at the image quite neighbourly to a Sellarsian.
However,  we will  start  explaining it  with recourse to a theory that  is 
starkly opposed to the Sellars' image of things, namely with theory proposed 
by Jerry Fodor in his work  "The revenge of the given". In the paper, Fodor 
insists  on distinguishing iconic  from discursive representations due to  the 
latter  having  canonical  decomposition,  or  namely  not  being  possible 
applicants to what he calls the Picture Principle:
Picture Principle: if P is a picture of X, then parts of P are pictures of 
parts of X31
What is claimed is basically the same as what we have claimed: that a 
sign cannot be composed into parts that retain the same 'meaning'. Fodor's 
30 Brassier, "Nominalism, Naturalism, and Materialism: Sellars's Critical Ontology", in Contemporary Philosophical 
Naturalism and Its Implications, ed. Bashour and Muller (New York: Routledge, 2014), 103-104.
31 Fodor, "The revenge of the given", in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. McLaughlin and Cohen 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 108.
and our approach to what is a sign is hugely different, but what matters at 
this point is the idiomaticity, or as Fodor puts it, canonicity, of the sign, or as 
Fodor puts it, of the discursive representation. Conceptuality is therefore not 
an act of defining an element but of  handling an idiom of sensations. Non-
conceptuality,  in  Fodor's  view,  is  something  different.  When  the  non-
conceptual representation is decomposed, it decomposes into units of itself.  
As opposed to conceptual  representation that  decomposes into units  that 
have altogether different functions and 'meanings' unless they are composed 
back into the conceptual  representation in  question.  But  this  sounds very 
strange. For, if one cuts a picture of a person into pieces, these pieces could 
be used to make a series of other pictures. Would they still be pieces of a 
picture of a person then? Fodor's argumentations seems to hinge on the idea 
that somehow the other pictures made by these pieces would be a wrong use 
of these pieces. For, otherwise, the difference between a picture of an ear cut 
from the picture of a human head and the word "ear" from a sentence "This 
human head has an ear" is non-existent with regards to how the parts play 
into the whole. Surely, there is nothing tying a sequence of sounds "ear" to  
the actual human ear; but this is not the point. The question is not whether 
the ostentation-design resembles a thing in the world – it  surely does not.  
The question is whether a part of the sign (conceptual representation) differs 
from  the  part  of  a  non-conceptual  representation  with  regards  to  the 
difference  in  their  decomposition.  We  believe  this  difference  is  at  least 
dubious – for if a picture x is made out of parts of the picture y, why would 
they be more parts of a picture y than they are of a picture x? "This is not 
what I mean", Fodor  (or a Fodorian) could say, "What I mean is that parts of 
a picture x cannot stand on their own without being parts of a certain picture, 
in this case x." As opposed to discursive elements? It appears not. Discursive 
elements can be described with reference to how they usually function in the 
discourse,  their  uses  can  be  analyzed  into  higher  probabilites  and  usual 
positions within a certain paradigm; but they will have no 'meaning' on their 
own. For a word to die, as Witgenstain told us long ago, is for a paradigm 
within which it made sense to die32. Isn't this exactly what Fodor is calling a 
property of  non-conceptual  representation?  For  a  part  of  a  picture  to  die 
means for  a picture within which this part  made sense to die? Therefore, 
Fodor is left with two choices: first, to claim that discursive representations 
are non-conceptual, and second, to claim that there is no more to conceptual 
representations than what he calls non-conceptual representations. 
The second option, the one clearly more reasonable, leaves us with a 
certain need for  further  explanation,  though.  According to our story,  every 
simple is a complex, and at least some (if not a majority of) complex can be 
used  as  a  simple.  This  does  leave  us  with  a  question  as  to  how  did 
conceptualization even come about – or to put it more precisely, how does an 
agent learn the signs without some previous knowledge of what to look for?
Or, as Wittgenstein puts it:
"32. Someone coming into a foreign country will sometimes learn the 
language of the inhabitants from ostensive explanations that they give 
him;  and  he  will  often  have  to  guess  how  to  interpret  these  
explanations; and sometimes he will guess right, sometimes wrong.
And now,  I  think,  we can say:  Augustine describes the learning of  
human language as if the child came into a foreign country and did not 
understand the language of the country; that is, as if he already had a 
language, only not this one. Or again, as if the child could already think, 
only not yet speak. And 'think' would here mean something like 'talk to 
himself'."33
This question emerges only if we posit "something to look for" as conceptual, 
and this is not neccessary. In Sellars' theory, the relation between the pre-
conceptual apparatus and the world is imagined as an object-object relation, 
32 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 32.
33 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 19.
a  theoretical  figure  he  names  'picturing'34,  which  is  a  pre-conceptual, 
fundamentally  causal  and  physical,  attunement  to  the  environment  which 
allows us to track changes. 
"But  crucially  picturing  itself  is  not  a  semantic  relation  or  function.  
Sellars describes it as a 'second-order isomorphism' between objects in 
the natural order: thus a CD pictures a piece of music via a complex 
transcoding of information from one physical medium into another."35
However, it appears Sellars at this point comes dangerously close to 
falling into the Myth of the Given. For, if the following holds:
"Ultimately, categories are to be explained in terms of  metalinguistic  
role.  Metalinguistic  role  is  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  correct  
representing.  Correct  representing  is  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  
picturing"36;
then  it  would  appear  categories  are  to  be  explained  in  terms  of 
picturing. Which in effect means that categories  are somehow sensed, and 
then  worked  into  a  semiotic-conceptual  network.  However,  this  is  not 
completely so. 
First, the fundamental difference is that picturing is not a mental event, 
but  a  causal  relation  between  objects;  and  second,  picturing  is  an 
isomorphism, a relation between forms and not  contents (allowing for  the 
tracking of real changes without positing their identity as real, thus escaping 
the mind-mirroring-reality problem),  and as such requires significantly less 
34 Sellars,  "Empiricism and the Philosophy of  Mind",  in  Science,  Perception and Reality (Atascadero:  Ridgeview 
Publishing Company, 1963).
35 Brassier, "Nominalism, Naturalism, and Materialism: Sellars's Critical Ontology", in  Contemporary Philosophical  
Naturalism and Its Implications, ed. Bashour and Muller (New York: Routledge, 2014), 109.
36 Brassier, "Nominalism, Naturalism, and Materialism: Sellars's Critical Ontology", in  Contemporary Philosophical  
Naturalism and Its Implications, ed. Bashour and Muller (New York: Routledge, 2014), 111.
then a propositionally-structured reality37.  Thus, picturing is the bottom line 
epistemological procedure – it proposes a causal interaction between objects 
in nature which in turn allows for the isomorphic events (in a weaker, and it 
appears  to  us,  more  plausible  articulation  of  this  relation)  between  the 
behaviours (for, even in the most passive version of picturing, picturing has to 
be a behaviour) of two objects. Picturing might as well stand, and we would  
argue it does. However, it has two specific problems – if it is posited as a 
passive  ontological  structure,  without  agents  crucially  performing it,  it  1) 
comes dangerously close to the given, and 2) cannot form an account of the 
establishment of the space of reasons. Firstly, if picturing is not accounted for 
as an effort  by the agent,  which also means agents can and do fail  at  it  
repeatedly,  it  gives rise to a strange image of  the world as calibrated for 
isomorphisms between objects – a metaphysical embarrassment we cannot 
allow ourselves. Secondly, again, if picturing is not accounted for as an effort 
by the agent,  which also means agents can and do fail  at it  repeatedly,  it 
cannot account for how (via experience of error, discriminatory intentionality 
and  bootstrapped  induction)  and  why  (because  they  cannot  be  social 
otherwise) do the agents eventually build conceptualizations.
Taken as a passive state, picturing is explanatorily insufficient. There is 
no problem with the idea that our effort-to-conceptualize are eventually efforts 
towards arriving at the correct picture of the world – even is we take, as we 
do, our effort-to-conceptualize to be of variety of manipulating other agents 
(itself  a  proposition  derived  from what  we  eventually  are  to  consider  the 
correct picturing of the specific problem), this requires effort-to-conceptualize 
how to manipulate other agents. To put it simply, while know-that is a subset 
of know-how, know-how is significantly improved by know-that. To put it yet 
more simply, while I conceptualize a pen in order to write, I cannot (or am 
37 Sellars  departs  from  "pure"  coherentism  by  positing  'picturing',  namely  the  causal  foundation  of  conceptual 
structures. And yet, he remains firmly anti-foundationalist, in that the foundation is causal and not propositional. This 
could be regarded as the pragmatist move par excellance, for while the nature is not propositional, we can test our  
propositions about nature because there is a causal connection between them and nature. This allows for the science 
to emerge as an effort.
less likely to) write without conceptualizing a pen. And while our everyday 
practices might stop short of clear conceptualization of agents and/or causal 
objects and their  relations,  for we might not need it  in order to reach our 
desired worlds,  the scientific  practice,  given its desired world is  the world 
explained, is not to stop short of correct picturing (which is not to say it will 
neccessarily succeed at it). Thus, we would surely claim that
"(t)here  are  natural relations  between  language  and  world  –  in  
particular, causal relations between linguistic tokens, which are objects 
in nature,  and other objects in nature.  Natural-linguistic objects can  
exhibit  systematic  relations with each other;  these relations can be  
isomorphic to the relations among the objects in nature; and proper  
epistemological methods will tune the causal relations between these 
two  relational  structures  so  that  an  adequate  mapping will  be  
achieved."38
And  yet,  if  we  posit  these  relations,  and  particularly  the  "proper 
epistemological  methods",  as  an  ontological  given,  we  seem  to  come 
dangerously close to the mind-mirroring-reality image of how things stand. 
What is needed, it  appears, is for these relations to be  performed by the 
(human) agents – for only so can we arrive at the experience of error that we 
find so fundamental in the formation of the human agent. Thus we need to 
talk about the human agent's abilities, specifically those abilites that precede 
conceptualization, that conceptualization cannot be reduced to (for if it could, 
we would fall into the myth of the given39), and yet that significantly enable 
conceptualization.
The  pre-conceptual  apparatus,  while  retaining  both  the  causal 
38 deVries, "Naturalism, the Autonomy of Reason, and Pictures", International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 18:3 
(2010), 395-413.
39 But also,  we should tentatively add, could not account for  junk transimission [for instance,  semiotic spandrels, 
byproducts of some other semiotic development] that could be said to make up a significant amount of our social and  
individual lives.
connection of the world and the agent as well as the isomorphic character of 
this  relation  (inevitably  presented  as  the  tracking  of  changes  in  the  
environment), presents the pre-conceptual state of the agent as  an activity  
which the agent is able to perform and which allows the manipulation of the 
environment. This activity can eventually give rise to conceptual activity as a 
fundamentally socially-acquired compulsion, because it, before any concept 
has been a part of the game, teaches the agent that it needs to put effort into 
this manipulation – and effort-to-conceptualize is the basis of social goings-
on. However, conceptualization, due to its social nature, is fundamentally not 
only mapping of the environment, but also the mapping of the mapping of the 
environment, due to conceptualization, according to our account, being built 
"from deixis up". This is an another aspect of the argument from MCE, and it  
again posits functions as idiomatic strategies that may be trans-situationally 
and trans-populationally distributed as  modal combinations,  but  cannot  be 
posited as universal keys to communal,  social  or semiotic structuring. We 
must remain populationist about functions even when all communities exhibit 
certain functions, and even (or especially commited to populationism) when 
there are strong biological reasons for these functions. 
This  is  substantially  allowed  by  solving  "the  enigma"  of  the  pre-
conceptual by situating it within agent's abilities, thus giving us a clear line of 
progress from isomorphic events via effort towards the space of reasons. The 
question of  justification then rests on the connection between the map of 
reasons and the resistance of the world towards actions that are derived from 
those reasons, or, to put it more precisely, that  are those reasons (being a 
reason is being an action that connects the assumption with the function). 
However, this resistance must also be conceptualized (we must be capable 
of  recognizing evidence-as-evidence) – and while science is the enterprise 
whose essential stake is precisely this recognition of evidence-as-evidence 
(and is thus a project of rationality, fallible but driven), our everyday lives and 
numerous communities and agents do not perform outside their idiosyncratic 
phronetic hierarchies. 
We would like to propose here two fundamental features of this pre-
conceptual  apparatus if  conceptualization is to emerge from it:  first  is  the 
non-universal,  non-conceptual,  "adaptive"  discriminatory intentionality,  and 
the second is the minimal set of rules of inference based on the relevance 
principle and bootstrapped induction. The two features, as we will see shortly, 
are not ontologically distinct, but synthetic; they will be presented as distinct  
for purposes of clarity.
First  is  non-universal  because  its  configuration  varies  across  a 
population;  it  is  non-conceptual  because  it  is  not  as  of  yet  capable  of 
manipulating  signs,  assigning  identity  and  instituting  knowledge;  it  is 
"adaptive" because it may be said to have survival value even though it may 
at times and partly be purely a result of random mutation; and it is, crucially,  
discriminatory,  which means it  does not  count  x-as-x (which would be an 
identity, and therefore conceptual, procedure), but counts x-as-not-y. This in 
effect  means  that  in  cognitive  development  difference  preceedes  identity. 
This is in accord with Brandom's claim of "differential responsiveness as the 
genus of which conceptual classification is a species"40.   
"A favorite idea of the classical British empiricists was to require that  
the  classifying  response  be  entering  a  sentient state.  The  intrinsic  
characters  of  these  sentient  states  are  supposed  to  sort  them  
immediately into repeatable kinds.  These are called on to function as 
the  particular terms in the base level  of  the neo-Aristotelian logical  
hierarchy.  General terms or concepts are then thought of as sentient 
state-kinds derived from the particular sentient state-kinds by a process 
of  abstraction: grouping the base-level sentient state-repeatables into 
higher-level  sentient  state-repeatables  by  some  sort  of  perceived  
similarity.  This  abstractive  grouping  by  similarity  is  itself  a  kind  of  
40 Brandom, "How Analytic Philosophy has Failed Cognitive Science", accessed 15. 2. 2015, 
http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/currentwork.html.
classification.  The result  is  a path from one sort  of  consciousness,  
sentience, to a conception of another sort of consciousness, sapience, 
or conceptual consciousness."41
The  most  widely  distributed  discriminatory  non-conceptual  intentional 
capacity, we would speculate, is the one of "human vs. non-human", for as 
we have seen, it appears our epistemic practices privilege humans in order to 
develop capabilities of conceptualization (and at that, we believe the largest 
amount of population could be said to enact this discrimination on the basis 
of differentiating between human voice and other sounds). 
The second is a minimal set of rules of inference based on relevance 
principle42 and bootstrap induction43.  Now, while we are already somewhat 
aquainted with the relevance principle, we must at this point have a small  
discussion on the theoretical figure of bootstrapped induction. Bootstrapped 
induction was first presented as such by Barnes in his text "Social Life as 
Bootstrapped Induction", but is essentially an old idea that needs constant  
refinement. It posits induction with self-referentially social veridicality as the 
basis for calculating behavioural decisions, and is built on an old anti-realist 
intuition that may be clearly accounted for only with a realist spin to it, namely 
the idea that in our epistemic practices we privilege other organisms of our 
kind as the source of direction and information. The other minds of our kind, 
it appears, realistically,  are more real – in the sense that we not only favour 
the information provided by other people over the information provided by 
other  environmental  changes,  but  significantly  conceptualize  the 
environmental changes according to the behaviour of other people. To put it,  
again, somewhat more robustly: while x does not have to be in metaphysical  
terms realistically x in order to be recognized as x (the changes we track in 
41 Brandom, "How Analytic Philosophy has Failed Cognitive Science", accessed 15. 2. 2015, 
http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/currentwork.html.
42 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), 
43 Barnes, "Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction", Sociology Vol.17 No.4 (1983), 524-545.
the environment can be conceptualized in a myriad of ways), we rely on the 
other mind of our kind to be able to recognize it as x (for otherwise we could 
not successfully communicate, and therefore organize, and therefore attempt 
at a more successful conceptualization). In the same time, this recognition 
allows for  the concept  to  have both  its  normative properties,  but  also its 
veridical (or, for that matter, modal) properties: therefore, not only does self-
referential social processes allow an agent to see the connection between 'a 
chair' and 'sitting', but also allow it to see the object a as a chair and object b  
as not-a-chair. As Bloor notes,
"Self-referential  processes  constitute  the  rules  for  the  use  of  the  
concept, which is how this all connects with Wittgenstein’s account of 
rule-following as an institution. Without rules and normative standards 
defining their right and wrong application, concepts could not properly 
be said to have a content, and without a content they can have no  
genuine reference at all. In this way self-reference becomes integral to 
external reference."44
To be enganged in bootstrapped induction means to engange in the act 
of collective performativity of instituting the object of judgement. This is in 
effect,  at  the  point  of  pre-conceptual  apparatus,  an  aspect  of  the 
discriminatory intentionality favouring humans in "seeking" guidance towards 
the  construction  of  conceptuality  –  the  infant  learns  what  is  a  spoon  by 
witnessing "others referring to it as a spoon" and "others using it as a spoon", 
and  once  the  threshold  of  sufficient  exposure  to  these  events  has  been 
surpassed, "the spoon" becomes an  active (inferentially rich) component of 
future inductions. It also becomes an assumption in the MCE. This does not 
lead to a strong anti-realism, which Edinburgh school is frequently associated 
with, nor does it lead to the intersubjectivism of the idealist kind – for it does 
44 Bloor, "Reply to Bruno Latour", Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., Vol. 30, No. 1 (1999), 136.
not mean that there is no chair, it means we learn what a chair is through a 
process  of  socialization  that  sets  the  standards  of  what  a  chair  is.  This 
socialization is a change is the environment that is real, as is the change in 
the environment that is a chair. However, the identity of the chair is a social 
construct by which we make use of the world – it is  a contingent sign (and 
more  to  the  point, a  contingent  function).  Another  such  construct  is 
socialization itself, and particularly, and this is where bootstrapped induction 
is of specific interest, social institutions that serve as heuristic devices for the 
organization of social life. These will be in more detail, and we believe with 
more nuance, presented as cases of semiotic stakeholding in the section of 
this thesis that deal with that topic specifically. However, one thing must be 
noted  here,  and  should  be  applied  rigorously to  the  following  concept  of 
semiotic  stakeholding.  We  will  quote  Barnes  here  at  lenght,  for  no  other 
articulation of this point is needed:
"Consider the simple case of 'bank is unsound'. A sophisticated 
individual, annoyed by the bootstrap, may disadain either to accept or  
reject  this  statement.  Why be concerned with it,  he might  suggest,  
when one can operate much to the same effect  with 'other  people  
regard  the  bank  as  unsound',  and  thereby  destroy  the  self-
reference loop?
A cunning  individual  can  certainly  make  good  headway  with  
strategies of this kind. He can set himself cognitively on the outside of 
the use of 'S'-type terms [my note: 'social kind', wherein the concept  
application  is  performative],  make  that  use  into  an  object  of  his  
own observation,  and operate profitably upon the basis  of  what  he  
observes.  City  slickers  do  just  this.  But  no  community,  however  
cunning,  can  do  the  same.  For,  as  a  community  destroys  the  self-
reference loop in this way, so it destroys the referents of the associated 
term. As the institutionalized item 'the bank is unsound' is replaced with 
'other people regard the bank as unsound',  the validity of  the latter  
utterance is progressively destroyed."45
The complex agent/community relation that is emergent from the neccessity 
of  continual  negotiation  of  function  and  ostentation-design,  and  the 
associated  neccessity  for  stability  of  signs  as  to  derive  behavioural 
predictions will be dealt with in the section on semiotic stakeholding. And the 
problem will not be finally resolved, but we do find semiotic stakeholding to 
be the  best  theoretical  figure  to  be used in  the further  discussion  of  the 
problem.  For  now,  let  us  return  to  the  discussion  on  the  pre-conceptual 
apparatus appropriate for the rise of conceptualization. The image we have 
come to is roughly the following: the discriminatory intentionality pushes the 
relevant information into the process of induction within which the truth/falsity 
(usefulness/uselessness) is determined according to the communal human 
behaviour  towards  the  intrusions  of  the  world  made  apparent  by  the 
discriminatory intentionality46. It must be stressed that while our conceptual 
capacities are clearly a sophistication and building on our non-conceptual 
capacities,  they cannot be retroactively reduced to them. There is nothing 
specific in our conceptual frameworks that can be said to neccessarily follow 
from our  non-conceptual  intentionality.  There  are  certain  robust  structural 
neccessities that follow, such as favouring of humans within the intentional 
realm and the two dominant inferential procedures applied to those realms – 
but it must at all times kept in mind that these themselves are probable in the 
population.  It  is  moreover  impossible  to  predict  which  "crutches"  will  the 
population  (or  an  organism)  choose  in  order  to  pass  from  difference  to 
identity, and it is especially impossible to predict the further conceptual and 
semiotic  developments.  This  is  the  result  of  a  myriad  of  dynamic 
environmental  contingencies,  and  particularly  of  social  contigencies. 
45 Barnes, "Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction", Sociology Vol.17 No.4 (1983), 537.
46 ("When the non-B is in the room I get food, therefore when I am hungry I want non-B to be here to give me food. If 
this assumption proves right, I will continue to act this way.")
However, it can be said that in our model "[c]onceptual transformations track 
material patterns without mirroring them"47, which is something we have noted 
in  the  Introduction  it  should  be  capable  of  accounting  for. What  must  be 
remembered, moreover, is that  the intrusion of the outside world does not  
hinge  on  our  being  able  to  conceptualize  it  –  quite  the  opposite,  we  
conceptualize it  in order to control it. The social,  and, by the foundational 
feedback,  the  agent  itself,  is  built  on  the  game of  giving  and  asking  for 
reasons, thus on conceptualization. As Reza Negarestani puts it: 
"The rational demarcation lies in the difference between being capable 
of  acknowledging a law and being solely bound by a law,  between  
understanding and mere reliable responsiveness to stimuli. It lies in the 
difference  between  stabilized  communication  through  concepts  (as  
made  possible  by the  communal  space  of  language  and  symbolic  
forms)  and  chaotically  unstable  or  transient  types  of  response  or  
communication  (such  as  complex  reactions  triggered  purely  by  
biological states and organic requirements or group calls and alerts  
among social  animals).  Without such stabilization of  communication  
through concepts and modes of inference involved in conception, the 
cultural  evolution  as  well  as  the  conceptual  accumulation  and  
refinement  required  for  the  evolution  of  knowledge  as  a  shared  
enterprise would be impossible."48
Now, one part of the question of conceptualization has been answered: 
the question of what it formally is, namely an idiom of sensations. We have 
so far been using the terms "idiomatic structure" and "idiomatic strategy" in 
different  contexts,  but  it  must  be noted that  they are merely two aspects 
47 Brassier, "Nominalism, Naturalism, and Materialism: Sellars's Critical Ontology", in  Contemporary Philosophical  
Naturalism and Its Implications, ed. Bashour and Muller (New York: Routledge, 2014), 112.
48  Negarestani, "The Labor of the Inhuman, Part I: Human", accessed 1. 3. 2015, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/the-  
      labor-of-the-inhuman-part-i-human/
(structure when we are talking about it as a thing, and strategy when we are 
talking about it as an action) of the same thing, namely of a sign. To remind 
ourselves, let's repeat that a sign is the idiomatic structure/strategy:
If (change in the MCE) A then (change in the MCE) B;
where  A stands  for  the  ostentive  behaviours  (ostentation-design),  and  B 
stands for the change in behaviour on part  of  the affected agent  given A 
(idiomatic manipulation). The further speculation would posit that all signs are 
stored  under  B,  thus  available  from  the  standpoint  of  their  behaviour-
changing potentials. 
We said that A is an ostentation-design (for instance, a word), and B is 
an idiomatic manipulation (for instance, a behaviour brought about by the use 
of the word). We have noted that what is called a concept is B, and that it is a 
set  of  public  behaviours.  To  put  it  more  accurately,  the  concept  is  the 
consequence of  the use of  the ostentation-design.  So in  order to  learn a 
concept, the agent sees an ostentation-design used in public and sees the 
changes to the behaviour  of  the other  agents  (human and non-human) it 
brought about, and infers the set for this concept  according to the what it  
chooses to the be its prototype, namely the family of its most relevant and  
usual uses, with a varying respect to setting the prototype up as to allow a  
larger amount of possibilities of uses different to the prototypical (as to allow  
a larger plasticity of the sign49). In this way, signs are reduced to functions 
they play in the community of sign-users, and not to things they supposedly 
represent. 
"(...) concepts are to be understood by the theorist in terms of the rules 
that make them explicit, rules that specify how the concepts are 
properly or correctly applied and otherwise employed."50
49 This is something we will make clearer in the part on semiotic stakeholding.
50 Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, (Cambridge: Hardvard 
To use a ostentation-design x means to bring about the function x, but it also 
means to be responsible for the function x because of the use of ostentation-
design x, and it means to spread the use of ostentation-design x for function 
x among other agents, and be responsible for this spreading. This is how 
signs are nothing but signals for bundles of normative commitments. 
"We might train a parrot reliably to respond differentially to the visible 
presence of red things by squawking 'That’s red.'  It would not yet be 
describing  things as red,  would not  be applying the concept  red to  
them, because the noise it makes has no significance for it. It does not 
know that it follows from something’s being red that it is colored, that it 
cannot be wholly green, and so on.  Ignorant as it is of those inferential 
consequences, the parrot does not grasp the concept (...) The lesson 
is that even observational concepts, whose principal circumstances of 
appropriate  application  are  non-inferential  (a  matter  of  reliable  
dispositions to respond differentially to non-linguistic stimuli) must have 
inferential  consequences  in  order  to  make possible  description,  as  
opposed  to  the  sort  of  classification  effected  by  non-conceptual  
labels."51
To  commit  to  hold  certain  inferential  consequences  when  using  a 
certain concept – or in our parlance, to commit to a certain function when 
using a certain ostentation-design – is what will come to be known by the end 
of this thesis as semiotic stakeholding.
Also,  it  should  be noted  here  that  it  is  tempting  to  corroborate  this 
account  with  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of  connectionist  models  in 
cognitive science:
University Press, 1994), 10.
51 Brandom, "How Analytic Philosophy has Failed Cognitive Science", accessed 15. 2. 2015, 
http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/currentwork.html.
"In  connectionist  model  'words'  do not  'encode'  experience. Rather,  
words  signfy  schemas,  which  means  that  the  units  activated  by a  
particular speech sound also activate a larger pattern of connections  
which are the active schema for a particular experience. The sounds of 
words are like 'pointers' to patterns of experience – indices to internal 
mental structures, not 'veils' between reality and experience."52
But, we will leave the details of this "marriage" for some other paper.
We have, however, been using the term 'representation' a lot. This is 
partly  because  we  adopted  the  parlance  of  the  theories  we  have  been 
debating with, but party because it is not neccessarily a wrong term. For, the 
idiomatic strategy itself is not public, only the ostentation-designs are, and 
they stand in the public relation to one another in a way that could be called 
representational. Both the beach and the word "beach" may or may not be 
ostentation-designs,  depending  on  the  particular  situation.  If  somebody 
points to the beach, this pointing and the object  that is the beach are an 
ostentation-design – one cannot say that mere pointing is the ostentation-
design because it is crucial to pointing to point to something. "To point" and 
"to point at a beach" seem to be two different ostentation-designs. Equally, 
when the word "beach" is written on some poster I am not looking at, it has 
no ostentive weight, it is merely an environment. Now, one could say – but it  
is obvious that the word "beach" should have ostentive weight, it is made in  
order to have it. Beach itself is certainly not. This is obviously so, but it is not 
the point. The point is that both of those things have a potential to be a part  
of the ostentation-design, despite the fact that they are not both made to be.  
Even more to the point, the term "beach" is made to, to put it very roughly, 
evoke an image of the beach in your head – and its purpose is therefore 
representational. This is not an account of what the sign "beach" is, it is an 
52  D'Andrande, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 149. 
account of what its ostentation-design is in relation to another ostentation-
design.  While  pointing  at  the  beach  and  saying  "beach"  bring  about 
completely  different  behaviours  in  different  situations,  their  ostentation-
designs  stand  in  a  relation  which  can  in  certain  cases  be  called 
representational – for instance, if somebody were to point at the beach and 
tell  you "Beach!",  intending for  you to use the utterance "beach" to mean 
"pointing at the beach as an object of interest for our semiotic exchange". 
The  relation  is  not  between  a  thing  called  beach  and  a  word  for  it,  but 
between two languages. "Beach" represents "pointing to a beach" the same  
way,  to  sneak  in  Sellars'  example,  "rot"  in  German  represents  "red"  in  
English53. They fill the same functional role in both languages, meaning they 
are, in our parlance, the same idiomatic manipulation. 
Now, once a sign is somewhat established in the community, and thus 
somewhat  established  for  the agent,  it,  so  to  speak,  feeds  back into  the 
agent's  perceptual  device,  sophisticating  it  in  accordance  with  the  useful 
mappings. This allows the agent to  track the environment (both, so to say, 
natural and social), and thus act upon it with higher probability of success54. 
This tracking is a tracking of functions, not meanings in the usual sense, and 
we must make the idea of functions a bit clearer here.
Firstly,  let  us  repeat  that  what  we  have  so  far  called  an  idiomatic 
manipulation, namely the change in behaviour on part of the affected agent 
given a particular ostentation-design, can also be called a function. Now, we 
must  not  fall  prey to either  the trap of  bad biology,  and see functions as 
evolutionary advantages (for a number of human semiotic practices have no 
real  evolutionary stake,  and another number is  even rather  detrimental  to 
humans), or to the culturist trap, and see functions as a closed set of stable 
practices within a community (for communities are in constant re-negotiation, 
if for no other reason then for the reason of semiotic mutation that is, as we 
53 Sellars,  "Empiricism and the Philosophy of  Mind",  in  Science,  Perception and Reality (Atascadero:  Ridgeview 
Publishing Company, 1963).
54 This does not mean that the tracking will neccessarily turn out to be successful. 
have noted, a constant in all  possible semiotic traffic).  We must  insist  on 
noting that there are, at least for a serious social scientist, no set functions in 
any sense, either vaguely biological or vaguely cultural. With respect to the 
debate  on  environmental  normativity,  functions  are  representative  of  the 
world  only  insofar  as  they  are  representative  of  the  mutual  cognitive 
environment in which the agent recognizes them. Namely, the tracking of the 
world  among  the  human  population  has  given  rise  to  certain  idiomatic 
strategies that are more probable, but by no means neccessary, across the 
different semiotic systems. This is all that functions are – a theoretical figure 
to help us talk about how do the ostentation-design x and the ostentation-
design y relate to the similar change in the behaviour of agents affected by 
either of them, while keeping in mind that the similarity is obviously in the 
eyes of the beholder and needs to be explicated by the beholder. Functions 
have  a  methodological  quality  of  enabling  comparative  discourse  on 
conceptualization across human population55.
For instance, the majority of known human languages share a marker 
of the speaker, a role that is in English filled by either "I" or "me". Agents are 
therefore capable of conceptualizing themselves as well as the environment. 
We are now going to try to give an account of how this is possible.
3.2.3.           Self  
So far, our model can be said to be built on the following beliefs: that 
conceptuality is an external event (it is derived from an observation we are 
cognitively capable of making and certain social enforcement towards making 
it repeatedly), that conceptuality is idiomaticity (it relates to a set of normative 
55 It must also be noted that functions, because they are idiomatic manipulations engaged in a phronetic competition 
within a situation, are to be understood in contagion (social transmission) terms not as behaviours, but as dispositions – 
this distinction is crucial in contemporary generative social theory. (We will continue to use the term behaviour, because 
it  is  a  clearer  representation for  our purposes.)  See  Epstein,  Agent_Zero:  Toward Neurocognitive  Foundations for  
Generative Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
commitments of the ostentation-design, not to a thing the ostentation-design 
denotes),  and that  we cannot  manipulate  anything that  we do not  render 
conceptual. Now, while we said that agent's basic feature is manipulation of 
other  agents,  this  definition  disregards  something  crucial:  that  agent  
manipulates itself as well. In order to do that, agent must have some image 
of  its,  so to speak,  inner life,  and to do that,  it  must  conceptualize it.  To 
explain how does the agent come to conceptualize itself and its inner life, we 
turn again to Sellars,  and its account of deriving statements about one's own 
"state  of  mind"  from statements  about  the  outside  world,  and  particularly 
about the outside social world. As we have previously noted via Sellars' myth 
of the given, to recognize something as X, one needs to acquire conceptual  
capacities:  to  assume  that  the  world  is  made  of  propositions  is  an  anti-
naturalist position. And agent is itself a part of the world, and events, so to  
speak, within the agent have to be distinguished with the same scalpel as are 
the events without the agent. To turn to Ray Brassier explicating Sellars:
"The ability to introspect and perceive that one is thinking X or feeling Y 
presupposes conceptual capacities rooted in linguistic practice."56 
Brassier rightly notices that a serious note must be added here: this 
does  not  mean there  are  no pre-verbal  or  non-verbal  thoughts,  it  merely 
means  we  have  no  epistemic  access  to  them before  semiotic  protocols. 
Thoughts are ontologically previous to signs and are,  by all  means, more 
than  signs;  however,  they are  epistemologically  after  signs,  they become 
available to us only once we assign semiotic forms to them. For our purposes 
this means: we cannot manipulate them without assigning signs to them.
"Sellars  is  as  much  of  a  realist  about  inner-thought  episodes  as  
Descartes. His amendment to Cartesianism insists only that access to 
56 Brassier, "Nominalism, Naturalism, and Materialism: Sellars's Critical Ontology", in  Contemporary Philosophical  
Naturalism and Its Implications, ed. Bashour and Muller (New York: Routledge, 2014), 105.
'inner'  reality is just as mediated as access to 'outer'  reality.  Sellars  
does not say that thoughts are necessarily public or even essentially 
publicizable; his claim is that our ability to understand what a thought is 
is tributary to communally generated and publicly shared conceptual  
resources."57
This is of particular relevance to our model because the hypothesis of 
self  appears to have a strong causal connection to behavioural decisions, 
particulary  in  their  phronetic  phase  –  agents  significantly  judge  their 
behavioural  options  according  to  the  social  place  they  see  themselves 
assuming and the behavioural capacities they assign themselves. Also, as 
picoeconomics teaches us,
"(s)aying that people are not equivalent  to their underlying biological  
phenomes is just a matter of semantic preference, of course, but it is a 
preference that seems to have good reasons behind it. When we are 
applying economic theory the reason is especially clear: the selfless – 
more aptly, 'non-enculturated' – organism has a different utility function 
from the person."58
The  only  way  for  an  agent  to  access  itself  is  via  transposing  the 
assumed conceptualization derived from publicly observable behaviours onto 
the intrusions of its mental life (which are not different in kind to the intrusions 
of the outer world) in order to control and maintain and change it, but also in 
order to make it  known to other agents.  This does not mean that what is  
happening within the agent is the same as these assignations, in the same 
way  what  is  happening  outside  the  agent  is  not  reducible  to  these 
assignations. Nor is there some kind of a mysterious similarity between what 
57 Brassier, "Nominalism, Naturalism, and Materialism: Sellars's Critical Ontology", in  Contemporary Philosophical  
Naturalism and Its Implications, ed. Bashour and Muller (New York: Routledge, 2014), 105.
58 Ross, "The economics of the sub-personal: two research programs", in Economics and the Mind, ed. Montero and 
White (London: Routledge, 2007), 48, my italics.
is taking place outside the agent and what is taking place inside it. It merely 
means that the tools the agent uses to conceptualize and communicate what 
is taking place inside it are the tools it learned to use to conceptualize and 
communicate what  is  taking place outside it.  Agent  gathers tools from its 
surroudings,  but  in gathering them, it  changes them in a myriad of  ways, 
some, as we have noted in the general anatomy, known and some unknown 
to it. Also, tools are, to repeat, idiomatic, and as such are highly sensitive to 
change of context: and the context always changes, so the tools are always 
adapting, with success as you were to measure it.  
And the measuring of success really is a tricky thing – it might easily 
lead us into certain determinisms of bad biology or culturalism if we were to 
establish a notion of successfulness from a certain objective viewpoint. In our 
parlance,  successfulness  is  something  that  should  be  derived  from  the 
agent's  account  of  its  desired  world.  It  must  however  be  noted  that  the  
agent's  account  is  always  made  only  of  ostentation-design,  and  the  
researcher  has  no  immediate  access  into  the  function  but  through  more  
ostentation-design  ("I  do  x  because  I  want  y",  where  both  x  and  y  are  
ontologically ostentation-designs).  This is why the agent's desired world is 
not  only  to  be  speculated  upon  as  a  certain  synthesis  of  other  agents' 
behaviours  (a  speculation  the  researcher  is  eventually  expected  to 
undertake),  but  is  to  be  judged  from  the  ostentation-designs  the  agent 
exhibits a particular interest in being used properly, which is something we 
will  call  semiotic stakeholding. To have a self  is  to engage in the specific 
subset of the practices of semiotic stakeholding.
We  are  now going  to  take  a  closer  look  at the  notion  of  semiotic 
stakeholding.
3.2.4.           Semiotic Stakeholding  
"What a better understanding of myth, literature, ritual, etc., has shown 
is that these cultural phenomena do not, in general, serve to convey 
precise and predictable  messages.  They focus  the  attention  of  the  
audience in certain directions; they help to impose some structure on 
experience."59
As all communication does, the particular cultural items (meaning, all 
material 'objects' of the particular population) that the anthropologists have 
been alarmingly focused on also  serve to  bring about  the  change in  the 
mutual cognitive environment. They do not 'mean' a certain finite proposition, 
they try to influence the way one conceptualizes which in effect should lead 
into the changing of the one's behaviour. As we have seen, our model claims 
all  communication  as  built  upon  this  need.  And  as  we  have  seen, 
communication is upgraded into communication with signs once a population 
of users of the particular signs starts to care about their proper use (and work 
towards  transmitting  it  accordingly).  This  means  they  have  semiotic 
stakeholdings – they are invested in the bundles of normative commitments 
the signs 'signal'. What they get in return for their care for the proper use of x  
is the ostentation-boosting potential of x. It establishes them as stakeholders 
in x, which in effect means that it establishes them as stakeholders in the 
behaviour x is 'meant' to generate. However, given that each individual agent 
that is a member of the population of stakeholders in x has a particular notion 
of the proper use of x, the social situation is the one of negotiation of x. 
What  does  it  precisely  mean  for  a  sign  to  be  in  a  process  of 
negotiation? In order to answer this, we have to turn to the prime pragmatist, 
Pierce, for his account of the relation between the sign's generality and the 
sign's vagueness.
"Logicians  have  too  much  neglected  the  study  of  vagueness,  not  
59  Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Cambrdige: Blackwell, 1986), 16.
suspecting the important part it plays in mathematical thought. It is the 
antithetical analogue of generality. A sign is objectively general, in so far 
as, leaving its effective interpretation indeterminate, it surrenders to the  
interpreter the right of completing the determination for himself.  'Man is 
mortal.' 'What man?' 'Any man you like.' A sign is objectively vague, in 
so  far  as,  leaving  its  interpretation  more  or  less  indeterminate,  it  
reserves for some other possible sign or experience the function of  
completing the determination. 'This month,' says the almanac-oracle,  
'a great event is to happen.' 'What event?' 'Oh, we shall see. The
almanac doesn't tell that.'"60
Human agents speak in  general  terms,  even when they speak of  a 
thing with a specific name. If they speak of Alice, for example, they speak of  
a set  of  behaviours performed by Alice to their  first-hand or second-hand 
evidential apparatus (the first being, so to speak, direct perception, with all  
the epistemic constraints that implies; and the second-hand being, ofcourse, 
through social account) in a situationally-mediated meeting with the bulk of  
their  general knowledge of  the world.  This name does not 'mean' Alice to 
them. It 'means' a population of Alices that "light up in their heads", as well 
as, hopefully, that "light up in all other people's heads" who they are trying to 
convey a message about Alice to, and whose behaviour they are trying to 
manipulate through the utterance involving Alice. The populations of Alices in 
two heads are different populations. This much is clear.
Given  this,  all  there  is  to  negotiation  is  a  conversation,  meaning  a 
disagreement.  Complete agreement is a monologue – the speech on which 
ostentation-designs  are  tied  to  which  functions,  rendered  using  only 
ostentation-designs  (for  instance,  the  cultural  items  we  mentioned  in  the 
beginning  are  an  example  of  this).  Conversation  is  a  negotiation  on  this 
question, it is a disagreement on the choice of ostentation-design tied to a 
60 Peirce via Zalamea, "Peirce's Continuum: A Methodological and Mathematical Approach", accessed 15. 1. 2015, 
http://acervopeirceano.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Zalamea-Peirces-Continuum.pdf 
particular  function,  rendered  using  only  ostentation  designs,  but  also  a 
negotiation of the particular function. 
One possible, and at that crucially possible behaviour on the part of the 
other agents, is that they will succeed in changing the 'meaning' of "Alice",  
that  they will  show the agent  conveyer  that  its  use  of  the sign  "Alice"  is 
improper. To be a stakeholder in "Alice" means to have a stake in this call.
This call can be answered for three distinct reasons: first, because the 
behaviour  that  "Alice"  is  supposed  to  convey  is  already  here;  second, 
because there is some behaviour that overrides the one conveyed by "Alice" 
(this  is  the  reason  that  can  be  tied  to  cases  of  oppression);  and  third, 
because  the  agent  conveyer  is  merely  learning  to  use  "Alice"  and  is 
effectively asking the other  agents  to improve its  use (in  which case,  the 
semiotic  stakeholding  is  the  sort  of  the  constructivist  toy  with  which  one 
learns to use the tool). 
The first reason is important for a social researcher because it shows 
explicitly that the greatest value of a sign is its possibility to no longer be 
needed. In giving up its proper use, we are giving up our allegiance to the 
sign, for we see we don't need it anymore – the behaviour it was supposed to 
bring is already here. Each sign that we hold a stake in is the sign that we 
wish  would  no  longer  be  needed  in  our  life  –  the  more  we  wish  for  a 
behaviour, the more we desire the sign to be made void. 
The  second  reason can  be  called  phronetic.  Phronesis  is  the  cost-
benefit  analysis  within  the  network  of  semiotic  stakes  which  are  made 
plausible via the available and recognized evidence provided by the situation. 
The list  of desired behaviours is organized by  choosing and adjusting the 
general principle given (in a non-ontological, in the sense of  as-recognized-
by-the-agent)  the situational  requirements.  Agents judge the situation they 
are in, and, as we have said, choose what they conceptualize as appropriate 
and available tools towards the establishment of their desired world, and in 
doing so, spawn a list  of  desired worlds  appropriate and available for  the 
given situation: for certain worlds that are likely and not-as-good can become 
more desired within a situation than those that are unlikely and better. This is  
important  for a social researcher because it  gives her information on how 
does the agent judge a situation, which information are relevant and how do 
these information influence the formation of the desire as well as choice of  
appropriate and available tools. 
The  third  reason  is  particularly  important  for  a  social  researcher, 
because this is in effect what she is trying to understand (namely, how does a 
population use signs?) and thus this is the crucial practice in the course of  
the research. 
Second and third  reason  also  require  us  to  note  a  specific  kind  of 
behaviour among agents, which could be called membership.  Community is 
found  on  limited  choice,  for  all  an  agent  has  at  its  disposal  are 
approximations  of  function  via  ostentation-design  and  a  changing 
environment. To elevate its chances of manipulating the world into a desired 
one,  since  an  agent  will  not  be  met  with  apsolute  possibility  of  this 
manipulation, its only intelligent prioritizing is to desire membership, primarily 
to the community it is thrown into, and at a certain point, if this is possible, to 
communities of choice among the communities available and affordable61 in 
the preset state of things. In other words, all there is to membership is the 
economy of our cognitive processes: members get something for free. What 
they get  for  free  is  a  set  of  assumptions  (normative  commitments),  and, 
crucially,  "a  promise"  that  all  other  members  hold  the  same  set  of 
assumptions.  Assumptions limit the space of functions (this could be called 
"the  principle  of  cognitive  economy"),  and  thus  assumptions  that  we can 
assume  we  share  limit  the  space  of  functions  within  the  population  of 
61 We have downplayed the concept of "affordability" in this text for simple reason that we cannot presently do it 
justice. However, it seems "affordability", as well as the whole are of ecological psychology will be of immense 
importance to the model we are presenting. For now, we can define that the affordances are the "properties of the 
context which may be creatively exploited for communicative purposes", as they are defined in Levison, "Deixis", in 
Handbook  of  Pragmatics,  ed.  Horn  and  Ward  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  2004),  106.  Also,  see  Heft, Ecological  
Psychology in Context (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 2001). It should be noted, regarding Heft's 
work, that we should not take affordances in the radical empiricism sense of sense-data, but in our Sellars-Sperber  
sense of being eligible to become a part of MCE.
members, allowing for the communication with less cognitive effort for more 
cognitive effect. 
Obviously,  membership  is  important  from  the  standpoint  of  social 
becoming  a  community, and  a  body  of  anthropological  research  into 
ethnogenesis  suggests  that  the  development  of  such  stable  social 
organizations is due to behaviours that could be accounted for by semiotic 
stakeholding:
"The ethnogenesis literature is a fairly new one, but  it  is  becoming  
increasingly clear that  most of  human history was characterized by  
continual  social  change.  Rather  than  timeless  groups  living  for  
thousands of years in their ancestral territories, new groups were being 
created, and old ones dissolving, all the time. Many of what we have 
come to think of as tribes, or nations, or ethnic groups were originally 
collective projects of some sort."62
For the researcher,  these three reasons mean that  the focus in  the 
social situation is to be on the agents that, so to speak, give up the signs, for  
their reasons for doing so are the basic introduction into what is taking place 
in the social situation. All agential behaviour vis-a-vis semiotic stakeholding 
is, effectively, vetting the other agents towards a goal of rendering the signs 
void,  which  is,  nota  bene,  never  completely  achieved,  for  the  complete 
desired world is never here.
62 Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology  (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004), 56, my italics
4. A Few Other Implications for Research
In order to perform something we might call  "social diagnostics",  we 
should  begin  by slicing  the semiotic  stakeholdings  into  three layers.  First  
would be those assumptions that everybody thinks everybody holds, second 
would be those assumptions that everybody chooses for themselves in order 
to  change  the  situation  and  those  they think  others  have  chosen  or  will 
choose in order to change the situation, and third is those assumptions that  
all are ignorant of holding (to be unearthed firstly by those within the situation 
that  hold  a  different  position  within  that  situation).  In  effect,  this  can  be 
translated into key questions all involved agents are to be asked, whenever 
this is possible. This does not neccessarily mean that our model is capable of 
accounting  for  only  very  small  communities  –  for  community  is  not 
neccessarily  the  situation.  Community  and  situation  are  in  many  cases 
different populations – for instance, when we are researching the plausibility 
of a certain policy, we are dealing with population(s) of performers and users 
of this policy, and even at that, we need to make a decision as to who are the 
key players in the social game, which in case of policy-making is the effective 
chain of performers of policy-delivery and those that policy will affect either 
directly (as a part of the policy) or indirectly (which can be recognized only by 
looking  at  the  populations  interlocked  in  certain  dynamics  that  policy 
intervenes  into).  The  questions  (which  are  to  be  developed  into  other 
questions  within  a  conversation)  these  are  all  (by  which,  in  larger 
populations, we can mean clear cases of those agents) to be asked are:
first,
What is the situation?
second,
What would you like the situation to be?
What can you say/do to change the situation? 
What would each other agent like the situation to be?
What can each other agent say/do to change the situation?
third,
What doesn't each other agent know about the situation and other agents?
From these  answers,  the  researcher  posits  the  functions  competing 
towards the resolution of the situation, as well as the structure of the social 
revealed  by  the  phronetics  of  particular  agents,  for  their  prioritization  of 
functions  gives  insight  into  manoeuvering  spaces  they  recognize  and 
therefore  positions  they hold  within  the  social  game.  The answers,  if  the 
conversation is successful, also provide the insight into habits and institutions 
that have significant assumption-seeding power.
All  of  this  requires  a  strong  speculation  on  part  of  the  researcher, 
surely; and at that particularly the speculation on  the unit of the sign  – the 
flood of discourse does not give signs, but they must be inferred. This is, for  
all  accounts and purposes, the basic "impediment" of qualitative research. 
The unit  will  surely be chosen partly according to the certain comparative 
trans-situational reservoire of signs (and, particularly, functions), and we can 
hope  these  will  become  more  sophisticated  with  each  research  if  each 
research  is  capable  of  conceptualizing  the  deviations  from  the  posited 
prototypes, and thus enriching the normative commitments contained in the 
particular  trans-situational  function.  Even  so,  researchers  are  to  be 
encouraged to begin with as particularly situational functions as possible, and 
only to build towards trans-situational ones with extreme care. That said, it is 
neither of consequence nor is it a wise epistemological commitment to ask 
for  an epistemological  puritanism at  this  particular  quest  –  for  this  would 
require the researcher to be on the ontologically different level than the object  
of  her  research.  And  this  is  simply not  true  in  this  particular  case  –  the 
researches has to be counted as an agent, for she not only inevitably but  
blatantly is. This is the stake of the research. 
Not  all  social  research  had  social  consequences,  but  the  social 
research of human history has shown quite conclusively that many did. Our 
present knowledge of the social is by no means adequate to posit predictions 
with certainty, nor will it, arguably, ever be. Thus it cannot posit which social  
research will have consequence. Numerous will at least on a local level, they 
will shape percentages of generations, or generations, or compartments, or 
future enterpreneurs, politicians, economists, lawyers, scientists, activists, or 
at the very least, citizens. All research is intervention. This seems to be true 
of  the  physical  sciences,  but  can  with  utmost  certainty  be  said  of  social 
research – not only in the fundamentally Kantian sense, but also in the very 
vulgar sense of consequences for the object of study. This means that the 
stakes are high enough to be plenty considerate in choosing the function and 
the populations one wants to observe and explain. Effectively, the scientific 
community should be pressuring the appropriate stakes.
The  determination  of  the  unit  cannot  be  done  without  the 
conceptualization  of  the  system  within  which  it  operates  (effectively,  the 
system  of  stakes).  The  way  to  escape  this  problem  is  to  posit  that  the 
reseacher to a point mimics the learner, who in effect solves it even without a 
comparative  system  to  fall  back  on63:  researcher  tries  to  complete  the  
determination, which leads to the negotiation of the sign. 
This is  the conversation, as opposed to an interview. Certain possible 
routes the researcher could take are: asking for allegiances, inquisting on 
reasoning,  exposing  paradoxes  in  reasoning  and  allegiances  directly  and 
indirectly, asking for the account of the other agents in the situation, asking 
for  the  account  of  the  other  agents'  reasoning  and  allegiances,  etc.  The 
researcher records these and analyzes qualitatively along with the general 
63 For, as we have seen in the chapter on conceptualization, the pre-conceptual apparatus could be speculated to merely 
structure the discriminatory intentionality and minimal inferential procedures.
framework  of  populationist  approach,  a  bulk  of  biological,  sociological, 
psychological, cognitivist, philosophical and historical knowledge, as well as 
any  other  science  the  situation  requires,  then  judges  the  stakes  of  the 
research itself (therefore, to an extent,  performs the reflection on her own 
externalized  judgment),  and  gives  the  best-bet  map of  the  functions  that  
make up the situation to the scientific community. (Interventer gives the best 
bet in the execution of a policy or a tactic.) In both cases, the stakes are of  
the research itself, which means the researcher is capable of judging what is 
at stake with the research in question – namely, what kind of behaviour will it 
generate? (If the particular research allows, the approximations on the stakes 
should be made explicit.) In effect, if we observe the observer, the researcher 
is making a phronetic judgement (a calculation of commitments). 
At this point our striving to count researcher as an agent among agents 
should become quite apparent. But in order to put a final note to it, let us 
insist that populationist research should be, whenever possible, done  by a 
population,  namely  a  group  of  researchers  that  have  to  negotiate  the 
interpretation of the situation among themselves – therefore, have to engage 
in the negotiation of  their  own semiotic  stakeholdings in order  to  find the 
signs that they as a population can institute.
5. Conclusion
This thesis tried to devise a model of an agent that could give the rise 
to the social. The reason for this thesis is to be found in our belief that in 
order to do qualitative research we need the model of  the agent and the 
model of the social that all interpretation can be gathered around to derive 
legitimacy  and  keep  track  of  significant  interpretative  commitments.  We 
believe this could lead to the limited, in Kuhnian terms, normalization of the 
social science, which it appears to need. This is not to say that social science 
needs to give up on its epistemic opportunism, but that it could derive more 
strenght from its epistemic opportunism if it were given a pivotal point which 
would drive its commendable epistemic wanderings back into a materialist, 
externalist and pragmatist framework. The most rudimentary propositions of 
the populationist approach could be stated as following: first,  the social is  
made of populations of  agents manipulating populations of  signs;  second, 
the agents are biological and historical contingencies that manifest reasoning  
and  form  desires,  and  make  mistakes  in  representing,  computing  and  
communicating  the  environmental  changes;  third,  the  signs  are  publicly  
observable changes in the environment (ostentation-designs; evidence) that  
are made to change the behaviour of other agents (function; inference) ; and 
fourth,  the  signs,  because  they  are  general,  neccessitate  constant  re-
negotiation, which allows for the tracking of agents' functional commitments,  
which in turn allows for the mapping of the social situation.
This  thesis  tried,  building  from  specific  theories  of  communication, 
conceptualization  and  self,  to  establish  a  way  to  inquire  into  the  social 
situation as a specific exchange of signs, most importantly their function – 
the  behaviour  they  intend  to  generate.  It  also  tried  to  account  for  a 
community, as a specific type of a human population, and particularly, it tried 
to  devise  a  way  to  track  of  its  three  main  aspects,  namely  learning, 
oppression and membership.  It  has done this  by completely inserting the 
researcher into the situation, and accounting for her practices of inquiry by 
the same means that the practices of inquiry of other agents in the situation 
are accounted for – namely via semiotic stakeholding. It  needs refinement 
and development, but we believe it  has ungrounded certain relevant ideas 
and brought them into a model that  could be a serious candidate for  the 
normalization of social science.
It has done this by making use of the pragmatist epistemology, one that 
puts the negotiation of the sign in the forefront of all organizational activity, 
and which posits that in cases of low social oppression combined with low 
resistance of the world, the institution of truth can be said to be successfully 
tracking the changes in the environment, meaning the chosen sign can be 
said to be appropriate. 
This  model  has  been  developed  because  of  a  belief  that  social 
epistemology has to contribute significant tools to the future social science, 
and that it is in a unique position to contribute tools to its most sensitive, and 
yet most needed, aspect – the qualitative research. While all serious future 
social scientific research must be an interface of various strands of research 
programmes,  understanding  the  social  situation  is  impossible  without 
understanding the specific configurations of reasons and ways of articulating 
those reasons among the agents. This understanding must be in accord with 
a  particular  model  of  the  agent  if  it  is  to  claim  any  disciplined,  and 
accountable, reading. This is why we have tried to contribute a model of the 
agent we find to be the best bet as to the largest amount of problems with 
devising such a minimalist, and yet usable, theoretical construction. We hope 
it will be a useful tool for the better understanding of the social in the future. 
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Abstract
The following thesis is an attempt at devising the theory of the social that 
would  enable  a  method  for  qualitative  social  research.  Qualitative  social 
research is, for reasons that will be presented, a neccessary component of 
serious  social  science,  but  also  of  its  instrumentalizations,  such  as  the 
practice of policy-making. The thesis that follows tries to construct a formal 
framework within which a negotiation on interpretations of social situations 
can  take  place.  It  posits  the  social  as  made  of  populations  of  agents 
manipulating  populations  of  signs  in  order  to  manipulate  other  agents.  It 
arrives at the methodological  proposition that  the signs,  because they are 
general, neccessitate constant re-negotiation, which allows for the tracking of 
agents' functional commitments, which in turn allows for the mapping of the 
social  situation.  The  model  will  be  principally  built  by  supplementing  the 
(certain key aspects of) theory of Wilfrid Sellars by (certain key aspects of) 
relevance theory of Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson, and evenutally by the 
contribution  of  the  author  in  form  of  the  theoretical  figure  of  semiotic 
stakeholding,  added  in  order  to  account  for  both  the  emergence  of  the 
community and the restrictions on the space of reasons by the social.
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social  epistemology;  social  science;  qualitative research;  Sellars;  Sperber; 
pragmatism; functionalism; agent; functions; semiotic stakeholding
